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Abstract
On The Problem of Uncertainty in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan
Ina Simon
In  the  following  paper  I  argue  that  uncertainty  is  a  key  hermeneutic  in  Thomas  Hobbes’s 
Leviathan by referring to an analysis the original text. Uncertainty is a barrier to the standard of 
reciprocity  in social  interactions  that  is  dictated  by God via  natural  law. The importance  of 
uncertainty  is  tied  to  several  key  conceptual  distinctions  –  among  these  the  division  of 
individuals according to two character types, modest and vainglorious, is key. Another important 
distinction is the difference in social relations between the state of nature and the civil state. I 
will argue that within the civil state the tension resulting from the uncertainty born of the two-
fold division of characters is resolved in a way that makes Christian ethics possible.
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The Problem of Uncertainty in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan
Introduction
What initially drew me to study the work of Thomas Hobbes is the fact that his ideas 
evade  easy  categorization.  Centuries  after  he  lived  and  wrote,  Hobbes  remains  almost  as 
controversial  as  he  was  in  his  own time.  Indeed,  it  has  often  been difficult  for  analysts  to 
reconcile what they see as contradictory tendencies in Hobbes’s work. As such, it has not been 
uncommon  for  Hobbes  to  be  accused  of  being  an  inconsistent  thinker.  Famously,  Arendt 
criticized him for being too authoritarian, Schmitt for being too liberal, Nietzsche for being too 
much of a humanist, and more recently, Taylor for being too mechanistic.  
Of course, other scholars, like Skinner, Malcolm, Curley, and even Strauss, have argued 
the opposite: that Hobbes is not just self-consistent but an especially brilliant thinker. They tend 
towards the position that such perceived inconsistencies are imagined more often than not and 
actually tend to result from deficiencies of analysis and method. Based on my study of Hobbes, I 
am also personally inclined to take the view that Hobbes is not inconsistent – instead, he is an 
especially complex and holistic thinker. 
Still,  the  sheer  extent  of  the  disagreement  between some famous  Hobbes  analysts  is 
confusing at best. I initially started out my inquiry by asking questions like: is Hobbes a liberal 
or an authoritarian? Is he a mechanistic thinker or a humanist? Finally, is he a rhetorician or a 
political philosopher? However, at the end of my academic inquiry, I have come to realize that 
these are perhaps the wrong questions.  To explain,  I  believe that such categories  tend to be 
anachronistic  and limiting so that  they threaten  to  distort  Hobbes’s ideas.  In truth,  there are 
elements  of both sides of each of the aforementioned dualisms in Hobbes.  Furthermore,  the 
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‘dualisms’ themselves are fluid given the fact that the meaning of words changes over time and 
space; this has led some to (often unfairly) accuse Hobbes of being inconsistent when it is in fact  
the  analysis  that  may  be  lacking  in  some  way,  like  failing  to  account  for  the  fluidity  of 
terminology over space and time. 
However,  this  hermeneutical  issue is  increasingly being addressed in the more recent 
Hobbes scholarship, which is more in tune with new developments in the study of language and 
communication.  For  instance,  in  my overview of  the  Hobbes  literature,  I  have  noticed  two 
significant positive hermeneutical developments – one methodological and the other conceptual 
–  which I have also tried to incorporate in my work. First,  unlike many traditional analyses, 
recent Hobbes scholarship is more willing to step outside the field of political philosophy and 
incorporate methodology from other disciplines like linguistics, literature, communication, and 
history. This seems to be largely thanks to the influence of scholars such as Quentin Skinner who 
emphasizes the importance of historical and intellectual context in understanding the meaning of 
utterances.   Second,  I have noticed that recent Hobbes scholarship tends to be influenced by 
‘critique  of  liberalism’  analytical  perspectives  rooted  in  Charles  Taylor’s  seminal  work1. 
Whatever their limitations, these analyses are suspicious about highly politicized categories such 
as ‘liberalism’, ‘authoritarianism’, and even ‘rhetoric’; because such categories are increasingly 
recognized as broad, vague, and historically fluid, these analyses can offer important conceptual 
corrections to studies of Hobbes2. For example, it is increasingly recognized that Hobbes’s so-
called  authoritarian  and  liberal  tendencies  are  actually  neither  contradictory  nor  mutually 
exclusive  within  a  properly  contextualized  analytical  framework.  In  other  words, 
1 I have also often seen these perspectives labeled as ‘crisis of liberalism’ and ‘post-secular’, depending on the field 
of study.
2 In fact, it seems that post-Taylor tendencies to analytical self-consciousness regarding terminology has led to a 
reassessment of both Hobbes’s and Machiavelli’s important contributions to liberal traditions and a renewed in 
interest in the term “republicanism”.
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liberalism/authoritarianism, philosophy/rhetoric,  and humanism/mechanistic are in many ways 
false dialectics3. 
The aforementioned positive hermeneutical developments might be a result of the fact 
that Hobbes is increasingly being studied by scholars who do not see themselves as political 
philosophers. This brings a much needed conceptual and methodological diversity to Hobbes 
studies. In the end, I believe that such interdisciplinarity leads to a better represents of Hobbes 
himself. To explain, Hobbes writes a lot about politics, which is why he is commonly (and not 
unreasonably) labelled as a political theorist. However, the label is constrictive and reductionist4. 
For example, by following Hobbes’s use of the term ‘politics’, I have come to understand that 
Hobbes’s fundamental  concern is actually  with ethics,  which Hobbes politicizes;  furthermore 
Hobbes often approaches ethics through the lens of theology and religion – in fact, I hope that 
this thesis will provide an example of how Hobbes mediates questions of politics (which are 
fundamentally about ethics) through religion. In light of this insight, my own interest in Hobbes 
has been mostly centered on his views on the intersection between religion and politics, which I 
believe to be central to his philosophy. 
Briefly, in this thesis, because the category of ‘religion’ is too ambiguous, I will discuss 
religion through the key Hobbesian concept of ‘uncertainty’. Generally, my analytical approach 
has been to identify the concepts that are most fundamental to Hobbes’s thinking about religion. 
However,  like  ‘liberalism’  or  ‘authoritarianism’,  it  is  important  to  note  that  ‘religion’  is  a 
difficult and elusive concept in Hobbes’s work. The most obvious difficulty is that he sometimes 
uses the term ‘religion’ to refer to both ‘true religion’ and ‘false religion’ (or ‘superstition’),  
3 See Skinner (2008) for an example of a historically contextualized analysis of the category of “liberty”.
4 Reading once of the available biographies makes it clear that Hobbes was much more than a political philosopher. 
He was also a: teacher, educator, advisor, historical and political commentator, translator, linguist, theologian, 
mathematician, gentleman scientist, and tinkerer.
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which are technically part of a dialectic. Also, sometimes he uses ‘religion’ to denote religious 
institutions  while  at  other  times  he uses  it  to  denote general  systems of  belief  or  particular 
ideologies of sub-groups within them. Finally, he sometimes seems to equate ‘religion’ (both 
‘true’  and  ‘false’)  with  Christianity  while  frequently  lapsing  into  comparisons  with  pagan 
practices and beliefs; in fact, his definition of ‘Christianity’ is also ambiguous and unorthodox – 
for instance, Hobbes tends to give hermeneutical priority to the Old Testament and Hebrew Bible 
traditions  so  that  it  is  hard  to  distinguish  between  what  is  typically  labeled  ‘Judaism’  and 
‘Christianity’  in  his  exegesis5.  Therefore,  somewhat  ironically,  in  an  analysis  of  Hobbes’s 
thoughts on religion, the term ‘religion’ itself is of only limited usefulness due to its complexity, 
which is why I have looked elsewhere for an analytical anchor.
That being said, not using ‘religion’ as an axiomatic category in my analysis is not a 
problem because Hobbes’s most important and interesting thoughts on religion actually tend to 
be implied, assumed, and mediated through other (less politicized) concepts. Just like Hobbes 
generally  uses  the language of politics  as  a  framework to  define  ethics  and ethics  to  define 
religion, I find that he often engages theological issues obliquely through discussion of other key 
terms, like fortune, foresight, the body politic metaphor, fear, and natural law. Because of this, I 
have searched for a key term that Hobbes uses to explain and define religion – the independent 
variable so to speak. In other words, I have tried to better understand Hobbes’s definition of 
religion  by  identifying  key  concepts  that  Hobbes  took  to  be  foundational  to  the  notion  of 
religion. This inquiry has led me to focus on the axiomatic concept of “uncertainty”, which is the 
topic of this thesis. 
5 I believe that this might be because Hobbes actually does not see a distinction between Christianity and Judaism as 
a result of his (qualified) rejection of tradition and experience as sources of theology. However, he clearly 
acknowledges them as different historical traditions, Further investigation is needed to clarify this.
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I have found that uncertainty is the most fundamental concept in Hobbes, which is to say 
that it is used to define most other key terms associated with religion. Furthermore, the concept 
of uncertainty is axiomatic because Hobbes relies on it extensively but almost always implicitly, 
never actually  explaining the concept.  Put differently,  ‘uncertainty’  is  axiomatic  in Hobbes’s 
thought because it precedes definition and argument which means that it is self-defining6. Having 
identified uncertainty as a key axiomatic concept, through engagement with game theory and 
Charles Taylor’s work on language theory, I have traced the origins or causes of ‘uncertainty’ in 
social  interactions  to  a  distinction  that  Hobbes  makes  between  two types  of  characters:  the 
psychological models of the modest and the vainglorious individuals. My thesis also explores the 
connection between the axiomatic concept of uncertainty and these two types of characters.
Therefore,  the  main  idea  that  I  want  to  convey  in  this  thesis  is  the  importance  of 
uncertainty to Thomas Hobbes’s philosophy in general and to his thought on the role of religion 
in civil society in particular.  According to Hobbes’s epistemology, uncertainty is a necessary 
feature of human life and all interactions are defined by it in various ways. Unlike most other 
important concepts in Hobbes, ‘uncertainty’ is uncomfortably metaphysical, seemingly trying to 
map how humans relate to each other as embodied beings within space-time with a political 
language framework. Therefore, an apt question is: when does uncertainty become a problem, 
and how can it be addressed? By referring to game-theoretical analyses of the state of nature, I 
will  demonstrate  that  uncertainty  is  a  problem  in  the  context  of  social  relations  within  a 
community  and  it  can  be  addressed  by  increasing  similarities  between  individuals  and 
confirming existing ones – preferably through contract and covenant. This uncertainty, which is 
6 I believe that uncertainty, not unlike Kierkegaard’s notion of ‘anxiety’ (also explained with recourse to the 
Hebrew Bible), is defined by an appeal to experience, to the place where physiology meets intellectual abstraction. 
In other words, Hobbes believes that the feeling of uncertainty is somehow fundamental to being a human 
creature.
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the cause of what Hobbes calls the state of war, can be phrased as the problem of not ‘knowing 
other men’s hearts’ (see  Lev.  intro, 3); in a social interaction, one basically asks: ‘who is the 
other to me’? And ‘who will  I be in response’? I will argue that, despite man’s intrinsically  
peaceful nature, uncertainty in social relations is the reason why the state of nature is a state of 
war – if  left  unsolved, uncertainty breeds mistrust,  aggression and ultimately war7.  Hobbes’s 
answer to uncertainty, however repugnant to democratically-minded commentators, is a return to 
a  biblical,  Old  Testament-style,  society  where  obedience  is  the  key  political  as  well  as 
theological virtue. I will also consider the Christian ethics of charity in relation to reciprocity and 
I will argue that charity is only possible in a political context of obedience.
7 A Nietzschean critique would ask: Why is aggression undesirable? Hobbes’s axiomatic position is that human life, 
human comfort, and general human flourishing, which is measured by the achievements of human culture, are good. 
See Lev. xiii, 9. He offers no other defense of this axiomatic starting point other than suggesting that such things are  
‘natural’ in the sense of knowable by most individuals using only the common sense they are born with.
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Chapter 1: Reciprocity
Questions about what to do are ultimately questions about who to be. Therefore, ‘how I 
treat another’ is inseparable from ‘who I am’. As such, Hobbes argues that social relations ought 
to follow the golden rule of reciprocity: “This is that law of the Gospel: “whatsoever you require 
that others should do to you, that do ye to them.” And that law of all men: quod tibi fieri non vis,  
alteri  ne  feceris” (Lev.  xiv,  5).  Briefly,  the  maxim of  reciprocity  neatly  sums up Hobbes’s 
understanding of the laws of nature, which are the basis of his understanding of ‘true’ religion 
and also the model of governance that politics ought to strive for (see Lev. xvii, 2; xxvi, 8). 
An ethical measure stick, the principle of reciprocity is an ancient maxim found in most 
cultures  in  one  form or  another.  Reciprocity  is  enshrined in  documents  as  old  as  the  “The 
Eloquent Peasant” (“do to the doer to cause that he do [the same to you]”), Hammurabi’s Code,  
the work of Thales, Isocrates, and Seneca (on the treatment of slaves); in Leviticus 19:18 God 
dictates to Moses the following: “you shall love your neighbour as yourself”, a law that St. Paul 
reaffirms in Galatians 5:14. 
Equality
The principle of reciprocity addresses the problem of uncertainty in social relations by 
attempting to establish expectations about others’ character and behaviour by assuming  that the 
other  will  respond  in  kind  to  whatever  one  does.  As  such,  reciprocity  is  founded  on  an 
assumption of equality or even equivalence between the parties involved; an assumption that 
‘you do as I do’ or ‘you are as I am’. There is a transactional aspect to reciprocity that becomes 
evident when one considers that one party to a social transaction must perform first, hoping that 
the second party will respond in kind. As hope is, according to Hobbes, an “appetite  with an 
opinion of attaining [it]” (Lev. vi, 14), reciprocity requires some measure of hope and trust and is 
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therefore perhaps more accurately phrased as: “I will treat you well if/so that you treat me well” 
or “I will love you if/so that you love me”. 
The conditional nature of the transaction that can be noticed in any reciprocal exchange 
emphasizes the uncertainty as well as the equality that is always inherent in social interaction. 
Hobbes offers a notoriously anti-social  version of reciprocity  stemming from equality  that is 
phrased as: “the weakest has [physical and mental] strength enough to kill the strongest, either by 
secret machination or by confederacy with others” (Lev. xiii, 1). In other words, the Hobbesian 
argument for equality is an equal and mutual capability of most interlocutors to kill each other if 
need be. From this rather violent understanding of equality, Hobbesian reciprocity is rephrased 
along the hopeful yet fearful lines of “I will not kill you if/so that you will not kill me” (see Lev.  
xiii, 1-2)8.
Defection and Retaliation
So what if, against all hope, another treats you badly? The other side of reciprocity is 
(proportional) retaliation. Accordingly, in such cases, Hobbes believes that “an eye for an eye”, 
or  lex talionis, comes into effect. As God commands in Leviticus 24:19-20 (NRSV): “Anyone 
who maims another shall suffer the same injury in return: fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth 
for tooth; the injury inflicted is the injury to be suffered.” Very similarly, in  The Elements of  
Law Hobbes writes that: “The sum of virtue is to be sociable with them that will be sociable, and 
formidable with them that will not” (I, xvii, 15). Therefore, when one other treats another badly 
so that there is defection from the maxim, reciprocity demands (proportional) retribution9. 
8 Hobbes controversially phrases the political contract as a mutual laying aside of the right to attack another.
9 Hobbes is not wrong here in relying on the maxim of reciprocity – Robert Axlerod’s research shows that a simple 
tit-for-tat strategy, or “equivalent retaliation”, where each player responds by imitating his interlocutor’s previous 
move, generally dominates in assurance games and can therefore be said to be the ‘natural’ response in the 
Hobbesian sense of the word. See Axelrod (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation.
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While Hobbes continues to advocate this principle throughout the entirety of his corpus, 
his wording becomes both softer and more indirect over time, especially when compared to his 
earliest  work such as  The Elements.  In  Leviathan,  Hobbes argues  for  the retributive  side of 
proportionality by making it a component of the first main dictate of natural law, which is to seek 
peace, by qualifying it with a right of nature, which is that man is bound to preserve and defend 
himself against those who would treat him badly (see Lev. xiv, 4). Actually, the second law of 
nature reconciles the first law and first right of nature much more neatly by advocating that one 
should  deal  fairly  only  when  others  do  so  as  well  (Lev.  xiv,  5).  Conversely,  ignoring 
proportionality in retaliation would be wrong. To illustrate, if a man acts fairly with one who 
cheats him, then “that were to expose himself to prey (which no man is bound to), rather than to 
dispose himself to peace” (Lev. xiv, 5). Note the implicit criticism to an ethics of forgiveness that 
is inherent in the dictate of self-protection.
Forgiveness vs. Proportionality 
Hobbes is careful here to hide his preference for the Old Testament over the New and as 
such  scrupulously  avoids  quoting  Leviticus  24:19-20,  or  any  similarly  explicit  Scriptural 
passage, despite the fact that he clearly advocates this exact model of reciprocal retaliation; and 
for good reason: he is not only contradicting New Testament “turn the other cheek” ethics, but 
criticizing it,  strongly suggesting that it  is an unjust and foolish thing to do. In fact, Hobbes 
suggests that, outside the civil state, Christian ethics is actually unnatural because it violates one 
of the abovementioned components of natural law10. 
The Christian ethic of “turn the other cheek” effectively breaks with the transactional 
aspect  of social  interactions  by setting  up forgiveness,  charity,  and even suffering (allowing 
10 I want to emphasize the fact that Christian values are inappropriate only in the state of nature. Within the civil 
state Hobbes seems to think that they become especially important.
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oneself to be victimized11) as the epitome of morality. To illustrate, in the Sermon on the Mount, 
Jesus says: “if anyone strikes you on the right cheek turn the other also” (Matt. 5:39 NRSV). 
Similarly, the Christian parable of the Good Samaritan tests and challenges the boundaries of the 
scenario  according  to  which  reciprocity  and  trust  come  easier  within  one’s  own  moral 
community.  Therefore,  Christian  ethics  are  not  really  about  reciprocity,  which  seems  to  be 
Hobbes’s most fundamental key value in the state of nature as well as the civil state, because 
they  never  really  respond  to  another’s  action.  To  illustrate,  whatever  an  interlocutor  does, 
whether  or  not  he  cheats,  one’s  ethical  duty  to  treat  him well  and  even  love  him remains 
unchanged.  It  is  interesting  to  note that,  because  variation  in  the  actions  or  character  of  an 
interlocutor do not matter (i.e., will not change how a Christian responds), Christian virtue is 
counterintuitively dominant and self-assertive in its message of charity in a way that is oblivious 
to the personality and actions of the other interlocutor; in fact, it is more about conversion than 
reciprocity and therefore is a rather radical approach to social relations that denies Hobbesian 
natural  equality  as  follows:  not  by  making  oneself  more  or  greater   than  another,  but  by 
counterintuitively making oneself less or smaller, to use somewhat Nietzschean terms. 
Equality in Relationships
To explain, in a reciprocal exchange, the first performer sets the tone of the interaction 
and therefore ‘changes’ the other to mirror himself. In other words, as Hobbes puts it, if ‘how 
another treats me’ determines ‘how I treat him’, then ‘who another is’ effectively determines 
‘who I am’, at least to some extent12. Therefore, just as the truly aggressive will strike first and 
therefore  set  the  tone  of  an  interaction  and  ‘change’  their  interlocutor  to  mirror  their  own 
11 Hobbes’s first right of nature, self-preservation, criticizes this position.
12 To what extent can another change me? As will be discussed later in the paper, Hobbes suggests that this influence 
is limited. For example, another’s aggression can change how I act (more aggressively) but cannot change my 
fundamental preference for peace, as preference for peace is intrinsic to human nature.  
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violence, the truly non-violent will similarly dominate the interaction by refusing to change in 
response to an interlocutor’s decisions.  Basically,  “turn the other cheek” ethics means that a 
Christian always performs first in a sense – he never responds but always seeks to set the tone 
despite  the  self-victimization  inherent  in  such  action.  Therefore,  Christian  ethics  challenges 
reciprocity at a very fundamental level13.
Because  Hobbes  believes  that  men  are  roughly  equal  in  terms  of  not  only  physical 
strength, psychology, and intellect, but also even faults and idiosyncrasies14, he does not believe 
that Christian ethics are appropriate in the state of nature. In fact, Hobbes lays so much store on 
natural universal equality that he proposes that forgiveness is actually naturally offensive because 
it suggests inequality. For example, Hobbes writes that: “To have done more hurt to a man than 
he [the doer] can, or is willing to, expiate, inclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must 
expect revenge or forgiveness, both which are hateful” (xi, 8). This is one of the more surprising 
passages in Hobbes because it sounds similar to some of Nietzsche’s positions where, based on a 
hierarchical notion of ‘greatness’, weakness is actually offensive. However, for Hobbes, based 
on his belief in equality,  any extreme concentration of power, whether weakness or excessive 
strength, is equally offensive in spirit, both in general and to the parties of a social transaction. 
Therefore, unlike Nietzsche, both extremes of inequality and disproportionality in the state of 
nature are equally undesirable according to Hobbes – forgiveness is as offensive to universal 
human equality as cruelty is, which Hobbes also strongly denounces as something unnatural (see 
Lev. vi, 47; xv, 19).
13 I am not engaging here with eschatological and soteriological considerations. Briefly, it could be argued that Final 
Judgement would technically return any situation to a cosmic balance of reciprocity by rewarding the good an 
punishing the bad in the ‘afterlife’.
14 Interestingly, passages like Lev. xiii, 2 suggest that Hobbes offers an early treatment of cognitive biases.
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However, I should note that the considerations outlined above apply mostly to a state of 
nature. Actually, in the end, Hobbes does believe that Christian ethics apply within a civil state; 
the role of the civil state is to permit such Christian-type social transactions. Briefly, where there 
is civil law, forgiveness and charity become not only rational but necessary. Nonetheless, in the 
state of nature, the same values are irrational and dangerous. Note the importance of the state (as 
a sine qua non) to Christian ethics of forgiveness – this ‘tribalism’ according to which politics 
precedes and enables ethics actually seems more in line with Jewish traditions. Note also the 
importance  of  external,  systemic  circumstance  to  human  interactions  and  to  human  identity 
(since ‘what I do’ is inseparable from ‘who I am’); the relationship between identity and action is 
a mutually constitutive ‘two-way street’.
Imagined Social Transactions
Going back to the observation that in a social interaction, just like in a transaction, one 
party must perform first and another then responds, note that maxims of reciprocity such as “an 
eye for an eye” and even “turn the other cheek” are  post factum.  In their  application,  these 
maxims tend to respond to a judgement passed on some action already taken by another party 
and therefore constitute matters of  justice. In other words, they are questions for the one who 
performs second in an interaction, once the tone of the exchange has already been set by the first 
performer. 
Unlike many justice theorists’ treatment of reciprocity, Hobbes is more deeply concerned 
with the motives and circumstances of the one who performs first. Actually, to be more precise,  
Hobbes is not even concerned with any actual real interaction but instead with the ex-ante, which 
he sometimes refers to as the activity of “anticipation” and other times as “forecasting”.  For 
example, Hobbes writes that: “from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for a  man to 
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secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all  
men15 he can, so long till he sees no other power great enough to endanger him” (Lev. xiii, 4). It 
is not clear how anticipation relates to justice since whatever injustice it responds to is actually 
imagined:  is  proportionality  actually  an  injustice  when  retaliation  responds  to  an  imaginary 
wrong?  
The ex-ante is the reflective ‘space’ where the first performer prepares to act16, which in 
a sense precedes questions of justice like it precedes the actual deeds17 (see Lev. xi, 9; xiii). It is 
relevant to note that even though it only comes into being after the establishment of the state, 
justice is nonetheless fully consistent with the dictates of the law of nature which it seeks to 
imitate and serve (see Lev. xxvi, 4). As evident from Hobbes’s discussion of the state of nature, 
the ex-ante perspective is completely imaginary – it is a forecast or a hypothesis about a future 
interaction  that  relies  on  some  preconception  about  the  interlocutor’s  character  and  action 
preferences; and this pre-conception is unfavorable for practical reasons: it is too risky to trust in 
a relative stranger when one’s life and livelihood are in the balance. According to Hobbes, given 
the  ever-present  risk that  the  other  will  cheat  or  attack,  in  the  absence  of  mechanisms that 
guarantees  compliance,  such as  those  supplied  by the  civil  state,  it  would  be  irrational  and 
irresponsible  to perform first,  which is  to say that  it  would be unwise to trust  a  stranger to 
maintain reciprocity so that, somewhat ironically, it becomes logical to break with reciprocity 
15 By “master the persons of all men”, Hobbes is referring to a general understanding of human psychology applied 
to foresee particular dangers and plan out interactions ahead of time. Similarly, Hobbes thinks it important that a 
sovereign to understand human psychology:  he “must read in himself not this or that particular man, but mankind, 
which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science” (Lev. intro, 4). Anticipation is the goal 
of political science, which Hobbes argues is an a priori and therefore ex-ante science.
16 Hobbes’s epistemology and psychology are consistent with this observation. For example, Hobbes writes that 
“because going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions depend always upon a precedent thought of wither which 
way, and what, it is evident that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion” (Lev. vi, 1).
17 See also Lev. vi, 55 more generally on “deliberation”: “Deliberation if expressed subjunctively, which is a speech 
proper to signify suppositions , with their consequences, as if if this be done, then this will follow, and differs not 
from the language of reasoning, save that reasoning is in general words, but deliberation for the most part is of 
particulars.”
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first.  The  ex-ante  scenario  might  be  hypothetical,  but  the  question  that  it  struggles  with  is 
eminently practical;  when there is uncertainty and mistrust of others, as per the first right of 
nature, one must seek self-preservation and therefore, when in doubt, prepare for the worst.
Game Theory
Once  the  transactional  nature  of  the  ethics  of  reciprocity  is  recognized,  the  ethical 
problem  of  uncertainty  in  social  interactions  can  be  represented  in  part  as  a  game  theory 
optimization  problem –  many  such studies  of  Hobbes  exist  (for  example,  see  Curley  1994, 
xxviii). However, before further engaging with game theory hermeneutics, I want to point out 
that it would be a mistake to reduce the ethical conundrum that is the state of nature to a mere 
game. The game analogy can create a useful model of the system within which humans interact. 
However, the analogy breaks down at many points, most notably when it comes to understanding 
individuals themselves – their preferences and motivations, as well as the origins thereof, which 
affects the outcome of games. Nonetheless, game theory is often used to explain Hobbes’s major 
theorem that the state of nature (i.e., the absence of institutions and law) is a state of war without 
much thought to further qualifications. As such, in true Procrustean fashion, game theory has 
popularized a “universal psychological egoism” scenario; by this I am referring to the mistaken 
notion  that  Hobbes  conceives  of  all  human  beings  as  self-interested  value  maximizers  and 
therefore thinks that people are naturally anti-social.  Most serious Hobbes scholars reject this 
view (see Gert 1991) but nevertheless it remains a dominant misconception among more casual 
interpreters (see Taylor 2016 on HLC model of language theory).
Universal Psychological Egoism
According to the universal psychological egoism scenario, a set of universal individual 
psychological  characteristics  (often  seen  as  ‘failings  of  humans  nature’)  predetermine 
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interactions in the state of nature as inescapably hostile. Briefly, in this neat but Procrustean 
understanding,  humans  are  self-interested  value-maximizing  “players”  locked  in  an  endless 
competition for power that only ends with their death18. Because of this, humans are naturally 
unsuited to peace (and politics). Peace is therefore maintained artificially19 when a higher power 
such as a civil government imposes and maintain it,  despite human psychology/anthropology. 
The implication here is that without institutions,  peace would inevitably collapse.  Briefly,  in 
game theory language, although peace is the optimal state of the game, because universal peace 
makes  everyone  better  off  than  before,  players  are  naturally  egoistic  at  the  expense  of 
community values and therefore must be forced to alter their behaviour by a quasi-tyrannical 
government  so  as  to  achieve  the  pareto  optimal  game balance.  As  understood  by  universal 
psychological egoism hermeneutics, politics and governance are a kind of a behavioural hack to 
optimize efficiency in a community, which is understood as an amalgam of egoistic individuals.
While it does the job of mapping the problem tolerably well in some specific situations, 
game theory is neither a valid nor a complete general hermeneutic because it tends to shape the 
particulars of the original theorem so as to fit the preconceptions of particular games. Universal 
psychological  egoism, whose association with game theory hermeneutics is  briefly described 
above, is a serious hermeneutical distortion of Hobbes that results from using the rough map that 
is  game  theory  analysis  as  if  it  were  really  equivalent  to  the  actual  terrain  of  Hobbes’s 
philosophy.  Most  importantly,  universal  psychological  egoism  misrepresents  Hobbes’s 
conception of human nature and therefore conceals the nature of uncertainty and the fundamental 
role it plays in social relations; as a consequence it also implicitly dismisses the religious-ethical 
foundation  of  social  interactions  by mischaracterizing  the  importance  of  natural  law.  Chung 
18 Power being the epitome of a scare resource/zero-sum game. 
19 (literally through art)
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(2015) argues that the universal psychological egoism scenario is a straw-man argument meant 
to weaken Hobbes’s justification for government20. I would add that it also builds a straw man of 
Hobbes’s take on religion – though perhaps this is  not as straightforward or as immediately 
obvious because Hobbes tends to filter his opinions of religion through the language of natural 
law.
Modified Bayesian Game Theory Model
So why are game theory analyses so wrong about Hobbes? According to Hun Chung, the 
problem is not game theory itself but rather its consistently incorrect application to Hobbes’s 
state of nature. In an insightful article, Chung (2015) argues that classical games like Prisoner’s 
Dilemma and Stag Hunt misrepresent Hobbes as a universal psychological egoist because they 
fail to properly account for all the parameters that Hobbes ascribes to the state of nature. After 
deconstructing  and  critiquing  traditional  analyses,  Chung  applies  his  own  more  accurate 
Bayesian game theory model of the state of nature with much better results. Briefly, the five key 
conditions of the state of nature as listed by Hobbes and summarized by Chung are: (1) rough 
universal  human equality  (of  physical  and mental  capabilities)21,  (2)  competition  for  limited 
resources, (3) division of men between two types of character: a modest (peace-loving) majority 
and a  vainglorious  (glory-loving)  minority  (*),  (4)  non-universal  egoism (*),  and finally  (5) 
uncertainty  in  social  relations  arising  from  the  inability  of  people  to  “reliably  know  other 
people’s types” (*) (2015, 486-488). According to Chung, classical game theory lacks either one 
or all of the last three parameters, each marked with an asterisk22: the distinction between modest 
20 Chung’s description of the straw-man argument goes as follows: if government is necessary because humans are 
all egoists, but it is demonstrably false that humans are all egoists, then government must not be necessary after all. 
Numerous scientific studies falsify universal psychological egoism and therefore some interpreters have wrongly 
assumed that this is an argument against Hobbes’s justification for government.
21 Hobbes is not quite arguing that all humans are equal but that the differences are negligible, so this is correct for 
the purpose of the game.
22 The PD and Stag games miss two of the five :the existence of two types and uncertainty about each other’s type. 
The Assurance Dilemma misses the uncertainty aspect. Therefore, these games reach the incorrect conclusions that 
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and vainglorious, the fact the former are not egoists but the latter are, and the state of uncertainty  
in social interactions that arises from the non-egoists’ inability to identify the egoists ahead of 
time.  To  this  I  will  add  the  more  general  critique  that  game  theory  also  fails  to  properly 
differentiate  between the  aforementioned  post  factum  and the  ex-ante of  an interaction  (i.e., 
whether it is actual or imagined/hypothesized) and consequently fails to understand Hobbes’s ex-
ante understanding of war as a disposition.
the state of nature turns into a state of war because of psychological egoism. The results of these games technically 
match Hobbes’s own conclusion that: the state of war is inevitable in nature, the Nash equilibrium of mutual 
defection is Pareto-inferior, while the situation of mutual cooperation would bring the most overall benefit. 
Therefore, it might seem like the games support Hobbes’s position. Despite this, the initial assumptions damage 
Hobbes a lot more than they help him; as Chung argues, given that Hobbes’s purpose is to mount a credible 
argument in favour of having government, the assumption of psychological egoism weakens Hobbes’s ultimate 
argument simply because  the universal psychological egoism is directly contradicted by both general life experience 
and empirical evidence from modern psychology – psychological egoism simply does not represent human beings 
accurately. In other words, a PD reading of Hobbes would be that Hobbes is correct IF universal psychological 
egoism holds. Therefore, a critic (who has not read Hobbes’s texts carefully enough) can dismiss Hobbes’s 
argument for government simply by dismissing psychological egoism (which is easy to do).
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Chapter 2: War
Hobbes mostly thinks of war in the context of the  ex-ante, i.e., as a possibility with a 
certain probability distribution that varies over time and can be estimated hypothetically at any 
given point. For example, Hobbes compares war to bad weather, constantly threatening but only 
occasionally actually happening: “the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it 
is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, 
but in an inclination thereto of many days together, so the nature of war consisteth not in actual  
fighting, but in the known disposition thereto” (Lev. xiii, 8). Therefore, a state of war is said to 
exist as soon as war becomes a real option of interaction, regardless of whether it actually comes 
to pass. Hobbes’s key point is that: “War consisteth […] in a tract of time wherein  the will to  
contend by battle is sufficiently known. (Lev. xiii, 8, added emphasis). Note that Hobbes is once 
again  engaging in  the logic  of  anticipation  and forecasting  instead  of  dealing  with practical 
questions and therefore bellum omnium in omnia, or the warre of every man against every man, 
is something entirely different from either jus in bello or jus ad bellum. 
Causes of War
Hobbes identifies three main reasons for why people go to war which he then ties back to 
two main psychological dispositions: “in the nature of man we find three principal causes of 
quarrel: first, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory” (Lev. xiii, 6). However, I propose 
that  “gain” is not a proper category because the  telos  of gain is ambiguous, and therefore the 
triad  becomes  a  pair:  diffidence  and  glory.  To explain,  security  and  reputation  are  ends  in 
themselves but gain can actually be instrumental to either. In other words, the telos of gain can in 
the end qualify as either ‘diffident’ (ultimately seeking security) or ‘glorious’ (ultimately seeking 
status as an intrinsic good). Therefore, all things considered, there are three ways to go to war but 
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only two real underlying ends: security and glory. Note that the former is practical and tangible 
(and  therefore  reasonable)  and  the  latter  is  what  Hobbes  would  call  vain  (and  therefore 
unreasonable). While Hobbes does not state this very clearly in this particular passage, I believe 
that this revised formula is a more accurate representation of his meaning throughout Leviathan – 
I hope this will becomes clear by the end of the paper.
Hobbes believes  that  diffidence,  understood as  violence  that  pre-empts  or  anticipates 
victimization, is the only rational and overall ‘natural’ reason to make war. By ‘natural’, I mean 
to say that diffidence is the only way to make war in a manner that is actually consistent with 
Hobbes’s natural laws. To explain, diffidence is a logical choice in scenarios where first law of 
nature (seek peace) and the first right of nature (seek self-preservation) conflict with each other, 
as they do in the state of nature, where following peace can get one killed, which means that 
killing another is never really ‘unjust’. Therefore, in the state of nature, because sometimes man 
cannot follow both natural dictates at the same time, it is the situation itself that is ‘wrong’ and 
not the individual; the only remedy for this contradiction is the civil state. However, going to war 
for glory instead of self-defence violates not only one but both principles of the first dictate of 
natural law and is therefore wholly ‘unnatural’ as a result. 
The distinction that I propose between reasonable and unreasonable reasons to make war 
corresponds with two distinct character typologies in Hobbes: the modest and the vainglorious, 
who  can  be  understood  as  cooperators  and  defectors  to  reciprocity-games  respectively.  For 
example, consider Hobbes’s original description of the three causes of war and note how he ties 
each back to a certain type/disposition of individual: “The first [cause] maketh men invade for 
gain; the second [cause], for safety; and the third [cause], for reputation. The first [type of men] 
use violence to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the 
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second [type of men], to defend them; the third [type of men], for trifles, as a word, a smile, a 
different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue” (Lev. xiii, 7). Once again, ‘what individuals 
do’ is inseparable from ‘who they are’.
The Two Types
The  twofold  distinction  that  I  have  already  discussed  between  reasonable  and 
unreasonable causes of war reflects a further distinction between two different character types 
within the Hobbesian narrative: the diffident (or modest/cooperator) and the vainglorious (or the 
proud/defector). For example, this two-fold distinction of characters is reflected in a distinction 
that Hobbes makes between those who make war for security and those who do it for pleasure:  
“And therefore,  if  any two men desire  the same thing,  which nevertheless  they cannot  both 
enjoy,  they  become  enemies;  and  in  the  way  to  their  end,  which  is  principally  their  own 
conservation,  and  sometimes  their  delectation  only,  endeavour  to  destroy  or  subdue  one 
another.” (Lev. xiii, 3).  Note the implication that those who seek “their delectation only” in war 
are in the minority (ergo “sometimes”). Therefore the diffident make war (reasonably) for “their 
own conservation” while the vainglorious make war (unreasonably) for the pleasure of feeling 
superior to other men (“delectation only”), which is wrong/unnatural because it contradicts the 
Hobbesian  principle  of  universal  natural  equality.  I  propose  that  this  distinction  is  a  key 
hermeneutic as it ties back directly to Hobbes’s notions of equality and reciprocity which anchor 
civil law onto natural law; natural law in turn being the principal way that God chooses to make 
his divine law accessible to human beings (see Lev. xxvi, 41). Briefly, uncertainty stems from the 
interaction between these two types of individual dispositions and therefore it is necessary to 
understand the latter in order to explain the former.
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The vainglorious, who are in a sense the root cause of the uncertainty that plagues social 
interactions in the state of nature, are described as follows: “there be some that taking pleasure in 
contemplating their  own power in the acts  of conquest,  which they pursue farther than their 
security requires” (Lev. xiii, 4). These “some” are vainglorious individuals who defect from the 
maxim of reciprocity and equality and make war in the pursuit of gain and glory and therefore 
are in violation of both the first right and the first law of nature. Hobbes also identifies a second 
group of individuals who cooperate as per the maxims are therefore not inherently problematic. 
Hobbes describes them as follows: “if others (that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within 
modest bounds) should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, 
by standing only on their  defence,  to subsist  [against  the vainglorious]” (Lev.  xiii,  4). These 
“others” are the modest, who are in a sense forced make war to secure their first right of nature 
(self-defence)  against  the vainglorious,  but,  unlike the vainglorious,  would actually  prefer  to 
follow the first law of nature (seek peace). It is evident that Hobbes believes that the violence of 
the modest is wholly rational and not to be condemned, though the same cannot be said of the 
vainglorious.
This modest-vainglorious dialectic is perhaps most clear in the following passage from 
Hobbes’s earlier work, On the Citizen (De Cive):
“All  men  in  the  state  of  nature  have  a  desire  and  will  to  hurt,  but  not 
proceeding from the same cause, neither equally to be condemned. For one man [the 
modest], according to that natural equality which is among us, permits as much to 
others as he assumes to himself; which is an argument of a temperate man, and one 
that rightly values his power. Another [the vainglorious], supposing himself above all 
others, will have a license to do what he lists, and challenges respect and honour, as 
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due to him before others; which is an argument of a fiery spirit. This man’s will to 
hurt ariseth from vain glory, and the false esteem he hath of his own strength; the 
other’s from necessity of defending himself, his liberty, and his goods, against this 
man’s violence.” (De Cive 1, 4)
Note once again that the modest individual accepts the principles of natural equality and 
reciprocity while the vainglorious actively defies them, both in belief (“supposing himself above 
all others”) and action (“[he] will have a license to do what he lists”). It is certainly significant 
that Hobbes styles the Leviathan “King of the Proud”, in reference to Job 41:33-34 (Lev. xxviii, 
27); pride, which is the Devil’s sin, is clearly the defining characteristic of the vainglorious. This 
observation further supports the thesis that Hobbes singles out a specific group or people, the 
vainglorious, as the fundamental reason behind the uncertainty that turns the state a nature into a 
state of war; note once again that the distinction between two types directly contradicts all and 
any universal psychological egoism scenarios. 
Fear of Vainglory
As previously  argued,  one  of  the  distortions  of  universal  psychological  egoism is  to 
overlook or mischaracterize the fear that exists in the state of nature: the modest majority’s fear 
of depredation at the hand of the vainglorious minority23. Fear in the state of nature is ex-ante,  
which is to say that the modest do not fear the vainglorious per se but instead fear not knowing 
who the vainglorious are, since vainglorious reveal themselves by their actions (at which point it 
is too late for the modest to defend themselves)24. Put differently, the vainglorious are ‘wolves in 
sheep’s clothing’ – this discrepancy between appearance and actuality creates uncertainty which 
23 Sometimes the modest-vainglorious dualism sounds eerily similar to the concept of trophic level predation, with 
the vainglorious at the apex position.
24 This is where the privacy of men’s hearts is somewhat of a problem instead of a good. The vainglorious are good 
at disguising themselves and their intentions. This is captured by  popular maxims about how politicians are 
untrustworthy; the popular idea that there is something wrong with those who seek power.
22
breeds fear for the modest.  This ‘hiddenness’  of the vainglorious  is  important;  for example, 
Hobbes writes that an interlocutor’s aims “are so easy to be kept from our knowledge, that the 
characters  of  man’s  heart,  blotted  and  confounded  as  they  are  with  dissembling,  lying, 
counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrine, are legible only to him that searcheth hearts [i.e., God]” 
(Lev. intro, 3). To summarize, although the modest are aware that their interlocutor might be a 
vainglorious  type and therefore  might seek to  take  advantage  of  them,  they  are  nonetheless 
usually unable to identify the vainglorious ahead of time. Therefore, the safest choice for the 
modest is to assume that anyone could be vainglorious and act accordingly so that they will be 
protected in all eventualities. 
The fear born of uncertainty makes the modest proactive so far as they shift their attitude 
in  a  defensive  yet  aggressive  manner.  Ironically,  as  a  result  of  the  fear  they  have  of  the 
vainglorious,  the  modest  come  to  actually  act  like  the  vainglorious  themselves,  i.e.,  more 
aggressively.  Another  way  to  put  this  ‘mirroring’  effect  it  is  that  the  vainglorious  come  to 
dominate and set the tone of all interactions in the state of nature by reputation (i.e., fear) alone. 
It is interesting to note that, to a superficial universal psychological egoism interpretation, these 
proactive modest types appear to actually be vainglorious types25. However, this indicates a limit 
as to how far actions determine personality.
The fact that,  based on their  actions alone,  the modest are indistinguishable from the 
vainglorious,  emphasizes  uncertainty  as  the  underlying  problem  in  social  relations  –  the 
impossibility of knowing ‘who is what character type’. To explain, if the modest are forced to act 
in a way contrary to their nature, then ‘what I do’ is not longer a good indicator of ‘who I am’.  
Therefore,  the privacy of one’s thoughts, which Hobbes sometimes refers to as the ‘object of 
25 Fear can cause the modest to change their behaviour but not in their essential nature – this seems to be the limit to 
the extent to which someone can influence their interlocutor through their behaviour. 
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passions’ and other times as the ‘content of one’s heart’, is both a blessing and a curse – it allows 
for  freedom of  thought  but  it  also  conceals  potentially  nefarious  intentions,  thereby making 
individuals  in  the  state  of  nature  weary  and  fearful.  In  the  end,  privacy  of  thought,  the 
discrepancy  between  (external)  obedience  and  (internal)  belief  ‘disguises’  the  vainglorious, 
which allows them  to coexist with the modest within the corpus permixtum of the community. 
Fortune. 
Hobbes is not the first to identify uncertainty (resulting in a state of war) as a major 
concern in the human experience. Uncertainty, under the guise of “fortune”, was an important 
concept for many Ancient Greek and Roman schools of philosophy26. For example, according to 
Rosemary Wright, “Epicureanism started as a theory of hedonism and desires, and resulted in 
practice  in  the  recommendation  of  a  restrained  and virtuous  life  that  was  proof  against  the 
vagaries of fortune” (1991, 7). Note the if one defines “hedonism and desires” as the precepts put 
in man by the law of nature, what Epicureans believe sounds very similar to what Hobbes argues.
Furthermore, representing the later Stoic schools, Seneca’s answer to the question of how 
to live with uncertainty is summed up in the maxim of  nihil perditi. On this, Nicholas Nassim 
Taleb (2012) comments that “Stoicism, seen this way, becomes pure robustness […] attainment 
of  a  state  of  immunity  from one’s  external  circumstances,  good or  bad,  and an  absence  of 
fragility to decisions made by fate”. Therefore, according to Taleb, the Stoic way to deal with 
uncertainty is to adjust one’s behaviour to defend oneself against  the very possibility  of some 
threat. Again, this echoes Hobbes’s  ex-ante  style of anticipation whereby the modest achieve 
“robustness” by pre-empting attacks by the vainglorious (i.e., by acting aggressively first) –  this 
26 Hobbes somewhat disapproves of this equivalence because it seems that fortune is in perpetual danger of reifying 
uncertainty
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is basically why the state of nature is a state of war. However, as Hobbes goes on to argue, the 
ideal way to achieve robustness is actually within a civil state.
Uncertainty  is  also  a  key  theme  in  Machiavelli’s  work.  Machiavelli  generally  uses 
fortuna  to refer to beneficial or detrimental events that are outside one’s sphere of control. In 
other words, fortuna is the amalgam of things that happen to someone, as distinct from the things 
that one causes to happen. Machiavelli’s  fortuna  differs somewhat from the Epicurean, Stoic, 
and  Hobbesian  understanding  of  fortune,  mostly  because  of  Machiavelli’s  comfort  with  the 
uncertainty  of  fortune.  Very  much  unlike  Hobbes,  Machiavelli’s  opinion  of  fortuna  (as  an 
incarnation  of  uncertainty)  is  actually  rather  positive  and  opportunistic  in  a  way  that  reeks 
suspiciously of vainglory. Hobbes’s description of vainglorious individuals is actually similar in 
many  ways  to  Machiavelli’s  understanding  of  the  virtue  of  manliness27.  However,  the  two 
philosophers differ greatly on the question of whether  manliness  is a good thing.  Machiavelli 
suggests that, like other pagan gods, fortuna is temperamental, capricious, cruel, and vain; but, 
fortuna’s favour can be courted. In fact, Machiavelli claims that a prince can court fortune as he 
would  court  a  woman.  For  instance,  he  writes  that  like  most  women  (of  Machiavelli’s 
acquaintance), Fortuna is impressed by virtus (manliness) above all. Therefore, by being virtuous 
(manly,  i.e.,  bold, aggressive,  courageous, etc.),  a prince can gain Fortuna’s favour.  In other 
words, a prince can sometimes make his own luck. This implies that Machiavelli views many of 
the qualities associated with vainglory favorably. Then again, Machiavelli is nowhere near as 
staunch advocate of natural universal equality as Hobbes.
Interestingly Hobbes seems to criticize Machiavelli implicitly in the following passage28: 
“The final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty and dominion over others) in 
27 From the Latin virtus which has connotations of both “virtue” and “manliness”
28 If I am right about this, then Hobbes actually serves Machiavelli in-kind: Machiavelli himself criticizes Cicero in 
the exact same way on the exact same topic of the virtue of  manliness. See Skinner’s Oxford Lectures
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the introduction of that restraint upon themselves in which we see them live in commonwealths 
is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby” (Lev. xvii, 1). In 
this passage, Hobbes suggests that those “who naturally love liberty” are the same as “[those 
who naturally love] dominion”. This seems to be a direct reference to Machiavelli’s distinction 
between the two humors found among men: those who want to avoid being dominated (i.e., want 
liberty)  and  those  who  want  to  dominate  (i.e.,  want  dominion)  –  note  the  similarities  with 
Hobbes’s own distinction between the modest and vainglorious. By joining liberty and dominion 
together, Hobbes is implying that the state of nature is so out of balance because of the anxiety  
created by the vainglorious that it  would be best to erect a supreme power to dominate over 
everyone  so  that  particular  individuals  may  not  dominate  each  other.  Basically,  under  such 
supreme dominion, the modest do not have to fear the vainglorious anymore – therefore, the 
modest achieve a kind of liberty from anxiety under the dominion of the civil sovereign so that, 
contrary to Machiavelli, liberty and dominion do go together after all. 
Religion as War
Finally I want to advance what might be a rather contentious claim: that Hobbes believes 
that religion is sometimes manifest as a form of the state of war. It is crucial here that I begin by 
making a twofold distinction: between religion itself and its institutionalized form, and between 
what Hobbes believes to be a mistaken and superstitious understanding of religion and ‘true’ 
religion as (mostly) revealed through natural law and (sometimes) Scripture.
Interestingly, Hobbes sometimes defines religion in a very similar way to fortune, which 
is  another  way  to  problematize  uncertainty.  As  the  notion  of  fortune  can  reify  uncertainty, 
religion can be used as a jack-of-all-trades explanation that  in turn deifies  fortune (which is 
already a reification) (see OL xlvi,  21). Another way to think of this mistaken basis of religion 
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as  resulting  of  fortune  and  uncertainty  is  that  whenever  religious  belief  is  substituted  for 
reasonable or scientific inquiry it must be wrong and therefore merely superstition. To illustrate, 
Hobbes writes that such superstition is born of the “the privilege of absurdity, to which no living 
creature is subject but man only” (v, 7). This  idea can be tied back to the interpretation of free 
will as pertaining to Genesis 3 whereby man effectively gains the ability to be objectively wrong 
as well as act wrongly.
The human desire and need to understand causality coupled with the intellectual failure to 
do so often makes humans fearful and anxious. This is true of social interaction in the state of 
nature as well as interaction with any object or process in general. When it comes to uncertainty 
in the latter understanding as relating to a process or object, Hobbes suggests that man invents 
causes of things he does not understand just to get rid of the stressor created by the awareness of 
his own intellectual failure. For example,  Hobbes remarks that “some of the old poets said that 
the gods were at first created by human fear” (xii, 6). Unfortunately, this process whereby man 
invents explanations sometimes turns out to be the basis of religion. As Hobbes puts it, “when 
there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse […] but some power or agent  invisible”  
(Lev. xii, 6) so that that “the second ground for religion […] is men’s ignorance of causes, and 
thereby their aptness to attribute their fortune to causes on which there was no dependence at all” 
(Lev.  xii, 17, emphasis added). Obviously, Hobbes thinks that this will always result in a false 
religion. However, this explanation should not be understood as Hobbes rejecting religion – but 
instead only false religion that is understood as part of an equally problematic dialectic of belief 
vs. knowledge. 
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Chapter 3: Evil and Sin
Equality between all men is the premise of reciprocity, which sums up the essence of 
natural (and divine) law. However, Hobbes claims that equality can be a cause of both war and 
peace. To illustrate, on one hand, equality is a reason for war so far as each man has a right to 
everything, including the other’s person and possessions (Lev. xiv, 4); but this is an example of 
an ex-ante scenario and therefore is mostly theoretical and best understood as an instance of “I 
could”. However, when individuals realize that each man is equally likely to kill each, equality is 
an effective practical deterrent understood as an instance of “I won’t”. Because it ends up being 
the ‘last appetite’ in a deliberation and (therefore is an exercise of one’s will instead of a mere 
inclination),  equality  is  stronger  as  a  deterrent  than  as  an  incitement  to  violence.  To  put  it 
differently, because equality as an incitement to violence is only an intervening variable in the 
process of deliberation, it does not really influence action and therefore remains unactualized or 
hypothetical29.  To sum up,  equality-as-deterrence,  as  the  last  appetite,  is  more  powerful  and 
tangible than equality-as-incitement (for discussion of “will”, “appetite” and “deliberation”, see 
Lev.  vii, 1-2). This is consistent with Hobbes’s belief that the law of nature, premised on the 
reciprocity born of natural equality, can be summed up as “seek peace” even though, in the un-
ideal state of nature, it also disposes men to war.
It is unclear how Hobbes thinks of evil. Hobbes often suggests that evil is to go against 
the laws of nature (like ‘seek peace’), which are divine laws revealed (for example, see Lev. xliv, 
1). He makes it very clear however that the state of war, which Hobbes calls “the ill condition 
which man by mere nature is actually placed in”, is not a blanket denouncement of mankind in 
29 Note that, given Hobbes’s definition of war as a disposition, this is sufficient to create a state of war but not to 
lead to actual instances of fighting – the distinction is crucial.
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general but instead more of a bad situation in which to find oneself (Lev. xiii, 13). Furthermore, 
on the suspicion born of uncertainty in the state of nature that leads to a state of war (as the 
modesty are driven to act aggressively), Hobbes similarly writes that one should not “accuse 
man’s nature in it [because] [t]he desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sins” 
(xiii,  11).  The  Latin  version  actually  adds  to  this  the  following  emphasis:  “But  why try  to 
demonstrate to learned men what even dogs know, who bark at visitors, sometimes, indeed, only 
at those who are unknown, but in the night at everyone?” (OL, xiii, 11). Therefore, I believe that 
it is fair to say that Hobbes does not think of human beings as inherently evil or sinful, nor of the 
state of war as a reflection of some general fundamental failure in humanity.
Briefly,  I  propose that  Hobbes’s notion of uncertainty  suggests that  Hobbes does not 
believe that people do evil because they are themselves evil and as such represents a limit to how 
far action determines personality. If one believes that Hobbes is a universal psychological egoist, 
then  human  nature  is  necessarily  a  problem –  it  is  the  direct  cause  of  war  and  suffering. 
However, once universal psychological egoism is de-bunked and the uncertainty arising from 
interactions between the two dispositions is recognized as a key concept, it becomes evident that 
the real problem is the state of nature itself,  i.e.,  the system within which humans interact30. 
Therefore,  given  the  systemic  nature  of  uncertainty,  evil  becomes  externalized  and  even 
politicized.  
Nonetheless,  man  retains  some  agency  despite  the  trap  of  his  circumstances,  which 
suggests  some  proto-ethical  obligations  of  behaviour;  these  are  to  be  found  in  man’s 
participation in natural law. To illustrate, Hobbes claims that there is a “possibility to come out 
of it [the state of war], consisting partly in the passions, partly in his [man’s] reason”, which is to 
say that man may bring himself out of the state of nature by following natural law  (Lev. xiii, 13). 
30 I will discuss this more in the section about Genesis 3
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Note that the seeds of man’s salvation from war are to be found in the law of nature, which 
operates  through  the  universality  of  passion  and  reason.  However,  it  is  also  evident  from 
Hobbes’s discussion of the causes of war that he believes that some individuals are less likely to 
follow the  dictates  of  natural  law than  others  and therefore  are  more  problematic  from the 
perspective of the proto-ethical community as a whole. 
Distribution and Predestination
I  would  argue  that  the  concept  of  uncertainty  is  as  important  to  John  Rawls’s 
theologically charged concept of the ‘veil of ignorance’ as it is to Hobbes’s ‘state of nature’. 
Hobbes’s definition of the state of nature as essentially the state of ‘not knowing what the other 
will do’ and therefore ‘not knowing who the other is’ seems like Rawls’s veil of ignorance in 
reverse. To explain, the veil of ignorance is a (ex-ante) thought experiment that imagines a state 
of not knowing one’s own character, i.e., not knowing ‘who you will be’ ahead of time (rich or 
poor; modest or vainglorious). For both Hobbes and Rawls, the trick to politics is to come up 
with  a  system that  somehow makes  this  problem of  not  knowing  someone’s  (the  other  for 
Hobbes and oneself for Rawls) character irrelevant by coming up with a system that neutralizes 
the danger inherent in the uncertainty by compelling behaviour using law. Another difference 
between  Hobbes’s  and  Rawls’  respective  thought  experiments  is  that  Hobbes  emphasizes 
uncertainty as an end, i.e., as ‘not knowing how you will die’ (since anyone could kill anyone) 
while Rawls phrases it as ‘not knowing who you will be born as’ – this hints at the limits of the  
precept that ‘who I am’ is a reflection of ‘what I do’.
Uncertainty  about  identity  as  discussed  by  both  Hobbes  and  Rawls  can  be  phrased 
theologically as questions of ‘predestination’ in a way that is very similar to how game theory 
considers questions of ‘distribution’. Bringing the two language-games closer together, I would 
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argue that game theory analysis ‘problematizes’ God as the source of both game parameters and 
independent variables. For example, consider Chung’s (2015, 504) Bayesian model of the state 
of nature, reproduced below; the Bayesian formula, in the top-left corner, forecasts the outcomes 
of the game starting from a set of variables, but what is its source? In other words, who or what 
decides the distribution of vainglorious (‘v’) and modest (‘m’) players in an interaction? The 
diagram hopefully illustrates the fact that the way that the Bayesian theorem hypothesizes about 
interactions  is  similar  to  Hobbes’s  conception  of  natural  law  and  the  ex-ante activity  of 
anticipation/forecasting,  which is  his  favorite  way of doing theology implicitly.  Furthermore, 
another relevant questions is: what is the source of independent variables of the game, i.e., the 
probabilistic  of  distribution  of  each  character  type,  represented  in  the  model  as  the  first 
branching? A way to re-think the question is to ask: why (and maybe how) are some individuals 
vainglorious in the first place? As seen in the diagram, Chung trances all initial branches back to 
the ambiguous category of “NATURE”, at the center-top, again, much like Hobbes traces all his 
axiomatic  positions  back to  the laws of  nature (aka.  God’s  agency).  To restate,  the implicit 
questions here are: why are some individuals essentially predestined to be defectors to the maxim 
in the first place, and, in Rawlsian fashion, who decides who will be a defector? As I will discuss 
shortly,  Hobbes’s  conception  of  natural  law,  considered  alongside  the  twofold  division  of 
characters, engages the same question. However, there is no further possible explanation for the 
existence and distribution of vainglorious and modest characters other than ‘uncertainty’ (for 
Hobbes)  or  ‘nature’  (for  Chung),  which  in  a  sense  are  ways  of  saying  ‘just  because’.  The 
observable fact simply is that according to the rules of probability, certain people are in a sense 
predestined  to  be  ‘vainglorious’  (i.e.,  defectors)  in  a  way  that  defies  any  further  causal 
explanation other than theological  ones,  such as predestination or even double-predestination 
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(some are destined to be modest/cooperators, others to be vainglorious/cheaters)31. The question 
of who decides who the vainglorious will be, or, in Rawlsian terms: who is behind the Veil of 
Ignorance, is a way of trying to problematize God.
Vainglory
In the end, all evil as conceived by Hobbes follows from a denial of natural equality; 
whenever men think themselves to be smarter, stronger, or better than others, war emerges as a 
possibility (see Lev. xiii). Despite the fact that he clearly does not condemn humanity in general 
for the state of war, Hobbes is very clear on the following: those who deny natural equality (and 
reciprocity) are inevitably wrong and their pride, which Hobbes prefers to call vainglory (Lat. 
Inanis Gloria), is the closest thing to a coherent concept of evil (as something that can be said of 
a  particular  person)  to  be  found  in  Hobbes.  However,  it  is  important  to  consider  that  the 
31 This is very likely a Protestant influence in Hobbes’s hermeneutics and exegesis.
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vainglorious’ type of ‘evil’ might be situational and therefore not really inherent. For example, 
while the vainglorious do have some innate tendencies to disregard the law of nature, they can 
nonetheless be adequately restrained by civil law, which in practice negates any ‘evil’ or ‘sin’ in 
them; this argument might sounds like a technicality but keep in mind that, if ‘what someone 
does’ is inseparable from ‘who someone is’, this begs the question: if someone never does evil, 
can he truly be called evil, regardless of any ‘natural’ predisposition? If this was indeed so, then, 
as previously discussed, the modest, who act aggressively for reasons of self-defence, would be 
equally guilty. Hobbes clearly believes that the modest individuals’ aggression in the state of 
nature  is  to  be excused because of its  logical  consistency with natural  law.  Briefly,  Hobbes 
believes that the modest act aggressively mostly out of fear born of a logical and natural desire 
for  self-preservation  that  is  consistent  with  the  right  of  nature.  As  to  the  fearfulness  of  the 
modest,  it  is interesting to note that Hobbes argues that  humans get scared in a way that  is 
different from the way an animal might be scared32. This human kind of fear implies anticipation, 
desire, and curiosity to understand causes and perhaps more akin to the current common usage 
definition of “anxiety”. 
Some aspects of the full meaning of the (16th c.) Hobbesian term “vainglory” are lost in 
the current  common usage definition.  The English “vain”,  as related to “vanity”,  indicates  a 
certain self-conceit and exaggerated (unrealistic) good opinion of oneself. This is consistent with 
Hobbes’s  usage.  For  example,  Hobbes  describes  vainglory  as  pride  resulting  from an over-
estimation of one’s own abilities:  “vain-glory […] consisteth in the feigning or supposing of 
abilities in ourselves (which we know are not)” (Lev.  vi, 42). Also, as related to the idiom “in 
32 This has to do with the fact that language has allowed humans to reason much better than animals. One of the 
consequences of this improved power of reasoning is that they begin to think long-term, which exposes them to 
problems of uncertainty.
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vain”, it suggests the futility of an endeavour – this is also consistent with Hobbes’s argument 
that, given universal human equality, vainglory is only imagined. 
The Latin term Hobbes chooses for vainglory is inanis gloria – this choice is interesting 
for several reasons. Because, technically,  gloria by itself could be translated as “vainglory”, as 
well as “boasting”, “fame”, and “renown”, the addition of inanis is a significant qualifier to the 
term. Also, Hobbes’s choice of inanis over vanus, which is the root of the English “vain”, reveals 
something further of what he means by the term vainglory. To explain, Inanis is the root of the 
English “inane,” which means “stupid”, “silly”, or “nonsensical” at best, and “idiotic”, “asinine” 
or “absurd” at worst33. Furthermore, aside from the meanings of “vain” already listed, inanis also 
has connotations of both “hollowness” (as in a lack of substance) and “foolishness” which have 
mostly been lost  in  today’s  understanding34 but  were certainly  present  in the older  (archaic) 
definition that Hobbes was using (see  Lev.  vi, 39, 41). Therefore, vainglory implies all of the 
following: exaggerated self-conceit, uselessness, futility, stupidity, hollowness, and foolishness. 
It is not always evident that Hobbes takes the problem of vainglory extremely seriously. 
For  example,  he believes  that  vainglory can result  in  insanity,  as indicated  in the following 
passage: “The passion whose violence or continuance maketh madness is […] great vain-glory,  
which is commonly called pride and self-conceit” (Lev. viii, 18). As pertaining to the gravity of 
the defect, I believe that Hobbesian vainglory is a rough equivalent of the Ancient Greek concept 
of  hubris.  For  example,  hubris  is  a  very  important  theme  in  Thucydides’  History  of  the  
Peloponnesian War, which is one of Hobbes’s most important confirmed sources. The dangerous 
pitfalls  of the foolishness or rashness that comes from pride is  emphasized  in  the following 
33 These are translations of the English term and do not all necessarily apply to the Latin term.
34 Preliminary research on the evolution of the term’s definition suggests that this might be an effect of the turn to 
individualism in late modern and post-modern culture which generally tended to validate concern with oneself that 
might at another historical time be seen as narcissistic.
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passage: the modest who are “men that distrust their own subtlety are, in tumult and sedition, 
better  disposed for  victory  than  they  that  suppose themselves  wise or  crafty.  For  these  [the 
modest] love to consult, the other [the proud] (fearing to be circumvented) [love] to strike first” 
(Lev.  xi,  10);  Hobbes  continues  his  warning:  “Vain-glorious  men  […]  are  inclined  to  rash 
engaging, and in the approach of danger or difficulty, to retire if they can” (Lev. xi, 12). Hubris  
is a theme that is also present in Jewish and Christian Scripture – Hobbes is certainly aware of 
this since he calls his Leviathan, which restrains vainglory, “the King of the Proud”.
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Chapter 4: Similarity 
Hobbes  writes  that  “men  measure,  not  only  other  men,  but  all  other  things,  by 
themselves” (ii, 1).Therefore, whether in the state of nature or in civil society, Hobbes believes 
in the idea of a common universal “humanity”. Despite the distinction he makes between the 
modest and vainglorious, throughout Leviathan, Hobbes always seems to insist upon similarities 
between people, both in terms of their strengths and failures. In the state of nature, he believes 
that all  men are  roughly  equal  and that  all  men are  fundamentally  similar.  For  this  reason, 
Hobbesian wisdom is sympathetic, which is to say that it is premised on understanding another 
through analogy with oneself (i.e., being able to ‘put oneself in another’s shoes’) (see Lev. intro, 
3). Hobbes explains: “[because of] the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man to the 
thoughts and passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself and considereth what he doth 
[…] shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the 
like occasion” (intro, 3). 
This inborn wisdom is premised on similarity,  which is another form of equality  that 
comes from God via natural law35. Hobbes argues that, when followed to its natural conclusion, 
the wisdom that  results  from recognizing similarity  leads  men to exit  the state of nature by 
contracting (with each other) and covenanting (with a sovereign) so as to establish the Leviathan 
for the common benefit  of all.  The Leviathan, the ideal civil  state,  actualizes natural law by 
compelling the vainglorious to follow natural law, i.e., to behave as the modest do instead of the 
other way around. However, note that in the state of nature, given the threat of the vainglorious, 
sympathetic wisdom can also work against a good man – yet another instance of how ‘morality’ 
can get one killed in the state of nature. Hobbes explains: “And though by men’s actions we do 
35 It is unclear based on my reading so far whether Hobbes believes that this is through imago Dei or as a later 
particular act of self-revelation from God.
36
discover  their  designs  sometimes,  yet  to  do  it  without  comparing  them with  our  own,  and 
distinguishing all circumstances by which the case may come to be altered, is to decipher without 
a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence, as he that 
reads is himself a good or evil man” (Lev. intro, 3). This emphasizes that an individual who is “a 
good man” by nature is disadvantaged and, if he would survive (as per the right of nature), he 
must make himself more similar to those who he fears.
Community
As such, it is only inside the Leviathan that similarity between individuals is permitted 
and maximized and therefore social transactions become predictable enough that the fear born of 
uncertainty is negligible. In other words, a civil state creates enough trust to have peace: civil law 
allows  “good  men”  to  behave  well  and  forces “evil  men”  to  do  so  as  well.  Overall,  civil 
citizenship brings a level of confidence to social transaction, which is defined as being in a state 
of  “constant hope” (Lev. vi, 19), whereas the uncertainty of the state of nature makes it a state of 
diffidence, or “constant despair” (Lev. vi, 20).
In a social transaction, the identity of one’s interlocutor matters a great deal since if one 
knows ‘who his interlocutor is’, then he can predict with some certainty “what he will do’. The 
question of moral communities is another instance where Hobbes prefers the Old Testament over 
the New. As most Hebrew Bible traditions see it, although there is a general kinship between all 
humans resulting from the imago Dei36, the covenantal distinctiveness of the Jewish community 
as God’s chosen people is always maintained. Similarly, even when setting aside questions of 
obedience and covenant, Hobbes believes that there are rules of behaviour depending on whether 
one with within or without one’s own immediate  community,  for the simple reason that the 
former kind of interaction carries  less uncertainty and more trust compared to the latter;  the 
36 Which could be argued is roughly equivalent to Hobbes’s concept of natural law
37
implication is that, within a moral (or even better, a civil) community, ‘who one is’ is much more 
likely to be consistent with ‘what one does’. 
As  such,  generally,  the  level  of  trust  in  an  interaction  increases  where  there  are 
similarities between the two parties, so that an Englishman might expect to interact more easily 
and  faithfully  with  another  Englishman,  or  a  Christian  with  another  Christian,  than  with  a 
complete stranger. Cultural, ethnic, and especially religious commonalities increase trust for the 
simple reason that parties implicitly agree to deal fairly because they adhere to the same ethical 
standards of behaviour. In fact, membership in a community brings with it social pressure to 
adhere  to  these  standards,  which  is  a  weaker  (non-institutionalized)  form  of  compelling 
reciprocity.  Additionally,  as game theorists  often  observe,  familiarity  and reputation  born of 
repeated  interactions  also  increases  trust  by  setting  precedents  and  establishing  reputations. 
Finally,  nothing  increases  trust  like  institutions,  which  have  mechanisms  of  compelling 
compliance and thus turn norms into ‘realities’, making natural law into civil law – this dynamic 
has interesting ontological and epistemological implications.
Christian Ethics in the Civil State
It is interesting to note that the application of the law of reciprocity changes upon the 
creation of civil society. Within a state, reciprocity is interpreted in a more tolerant and indeed 
more Christian way. For example, Quentin Skinner  (2016) points out in “Hobbes and the Social 
Control of Unsociability” that Hobbes believes that unsociable people must be tolerated within 
the civil state (as long as they do not seriously threaten the security of the state in a tangible 
way). Within the civil state, as Skinner puts it, “Self-control, as much as the coercive force of 
law, is the key to peace” (2016, 448). Similarly, Edwin Curley (2007) writes in “Hobbes and the 
Cause of  Religious  Toleration”  that  Hobbes advocates  toleration  within the  civil  state  to  an 
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almost surprising degree. Therefore, Christian ethics, which are unnatural outside the civil state, 
become natural and even necessary after the social contract37;  the Leviathan is a surprisingly 
tolerant state. Still, it is important to keep in mind that law and ethics, as versions of pre-existing  
natural  law,  are  not  created  by the  state;  the  state  simply  changes  the  conditions  of  human 
interactions so that the laws of nature can manifest more freely through individuals.
As discussed above, within a state,  uncertainty is eliminated in the ways that  matter, 
which  is  to  say  that  the  establishment  and  enforcement  of  laws  makes  non-performance  of 
reciprocity impossible. However, the similarity that citizenship forces onto individuals should 
not be exaggerated – the only important thing is that, in mutual obedience to civil law, one can 
predict what his interlocutor will  not  do: treat him badly – cheat or kill him38. Law therefore 
limits the uncertainty that so plagues the state of nature by setting limits to interactions through 
the punishment (and therefore discouragement) of ‘vainglorious’ behaviour. As such, potential 
defectors are restrained and tentative cooperators are encouraged. Within the bounds of civil law, 
individuals become similar in their (compelled) commitment to an ethics of reciprocity, which 
implies a moral and religious equality of all people under the civil law; note that civil law simply 
enforces  ethical  ideas  that  Hobbes  believes  to  already  exist  in  the  state  of  nature  as  quasi-
universal desires and inclinations39.
Civil society not only allows the natural similarities between individuals to manifest but 
also makes individuals  more similar  through education.  While  Hobbes believes  the passions 
(psychology) are universal, the particular objects of said passions differ between individuals. For 
example: “I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men, desire, fear, hope, &c, 
37 I suppose that this is Hobbes’s way of saying that there can be no such thing as Christian anarchism.
38 If, as Hobbes advocates, civil law should also enforce customs of politeness, then ‘disrespect’ is also ‘take off the 
table’ in ‘civil’ inteactions.
39 Or, to put it differently, civil law fulfils the intrinsic human moral and religious equality that has so far been 
denied actual manifestation by the condition of nature.
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not the similitude of the objects of the passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped, &c; 
for these the constitution individual and particular education do so vary” (Lev.  intro, 3). The 
importance of education to Hobbes’s conception of citizenship, which implies justice and ethics, 
is well-known and well-studied.
Hobbes believes that civil law is premised only on authority, and not truth, just as it is 
based on obedience, not belief (see OL xxvi, 20). Conversely, because of its universality and 
constancy, it seems that natural law would qualify as the seat of truth. For example, civil law can 
force compliance, which implies conformity in both action and discourse, but cannot force belief, 
which  is  influenced by passion and reason (which  are  both part  of  natural  law) (xxvi,  41). 
Conversely,  natural  law allows for  freedom of  thought  and action  but  binds  desire  (‘what  I 
want’) and reason (‘how do I get there’). Because ‘who I am’ always comes back to ‘what I do’ 
and vice versa, civil law can never stray too far from natural law given the latter’s innateness. To 
illustrate,  consider  the  proper  realms  of  natural  and  civil  law  respectively.  As  previously 
discussed, the state of nature is dominated by pre-ante considerations, or hypotheses about future 
social  interactions.  In  the  civil  state,  law  and  custom  replace  these  hypotheses  by  taking 
defection ‘off the table’ for all players40. Therefore, the main concern within civil states shifts 
towards  post factum  questions of justice, which respond to interactions already past, based on 
whether or not they were consistent with the law. The distinction between truth and choice is 
crucial, as reflected in Hobbes’s interpretation of Genesis 3 the Biblical narrative of the Fall. 
40 Put otherwise, law eliminates the need to engage in such constant anticipation.
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Chapter 5: Free Will, Obedience, and Knowledge
There is much disagreement over Hobbes’s perspective on religion that often stems from 
explicit or implicit disagreement over how civil and natural law relate. There is an undeniable 
synergy and correspondence between civil and natural law; as Hobbes puts it, “The law of nature 
and the civil law contain each other” (Lev. xxvi, 8). As to the nature of the relationship between 
the two, I would argue that Hobbes believes that civil law ‘actualizes’ natural law by compelling 
obedience. For example, Hobbes writes: “For the laws of nature, which consist in equity, justice, 
gratitude, and other moral virtues on these depending […] are not properly laws, but qualities  
that dispose men to peace and to obedience” (Lev. xxvi, 8, added emphasis). Therefore, whereas 
natural  law “disposes” individuals  to  follow reciprocity,  civil  law compels  them to  do so – 
therefore civil law is a version of natural law “properly” enforced by effectively taking away 
individuals’ choice about whether or not to adhere to principles of reciprocity. Implicitly, those 
restrained  are  the  ones  who  would  act  against  the  laws  of  nature  if  given  a  chance:  the 
vainglorious.  Keep in  mind that,  for  Hobbes,  obedience  is  the  key political  and theological 
virtue.
As  already  discussed,  natural  law  seems  to  be  premised  on  its  innateness  and  its 
universality and therefore precedes the human artifice that imitates it. Therefore, civil law exists 
as a self-contained ontological (and epistemological) ‘bubble’ within nature41. Civil law comes 
from sovereignty, which  emerges from the social contract in imitation of “the art whereby God 
hath made and governs the world,” by which Hobbes is referring to physical law – the object of 
science – which is manifest in orderly chains of cause and effect (Lev.  intro, 1). In contrast, 
natural law manifests as an innate inclination or instinct which, as a consequence of free will, 
41 This is reminiscent of the microcosm-macrocosm idea which was especially prevalent in medieval theology and 
philosophy. 
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allows the individual the choice of whether to follow it or not. Civil law allows no such room for 
free will.  In  its  imitatio  Dei  as mimesis  of nature, civil  law comes to  occupy an interesting 
epistemological place that is neither arbitrary nor universal but something in between the law of 
nature  and  physical  law.  To  illustrate,  while  laws  vary  between  different  cultures,  they  are 
similar in essence more often than not42. This reflects the universality of the laws of nature that 
underlie civil law but also accounts for cultural subjectivity. Furthermore, similarly, the power of 
law to compel is neither absolute not relative– for instance, cheaters are most often caught and 
punished according to the law but there are always exceptions.  
Note that the law of nature itself exists and operates in the exact same way in both the 
natural  and  civil  dimensions.  Put  differently,  the  dictates  of  natural  law  do  not  change  as 
individuals  pass  from the  state  of  nature  to  the  civil  state  –  reciprocity  (qualified  by  self-
preservation)  is  always ‘the right  thing to  do’,  both emotionally and rationally,  whether  one 
decides to follow it or not. However, as the context of social interaction changes, in a civil state, 
labels such as “just” and “ethical” are simply added to the instinctive unchanging ‘rightness’ 
evoked by natural law. Consequently, civil law can be thought of as a layer that is added onto 
natural law, not to modify it (which would not be possible in any case) but to change individuals 
according to it as needed by changing their behaviour through an impositions of new parameters 
(via institutions that guarantee cooperation)43. To summarize, the essential change that happens 
in the move from a state of nature to a civil state is that individuals simply lose the option of 
either misinterpreting or disregarding the dictates of natural law in their actions – civil law ‘rigs 
the  game’  (or,  alternately,  fixes it)  to  eliminate  the  problem  of  defection  caused  by  the 
vainglorious in the state of nature. Note that, in a civil state, instead of the modest having to 
42 Murder, theft, and perjury for example tend to be illegal.
43 Since ‘what I do’ is inseparable about ‘who I am’
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change  themselves  to  mirror  the  personality  of  the  vainglorious  in  the  actions,  it  is  the 
vainglorious who must change.
Free Will and Obedience
Hobbes’s account of the Fall is often criticized. For example, Edwin Curley writes that: 
“Hobbes’s account of the fall is puzzling”: (a) he denies that Adam and Eve acquired a new 
ability to distinguish between good and evil, but (b) says that only after they ate of the tree did  
they judge their nakedness to be improper. (a) and (b) will be consistent only if their judgement 
after eating of the tree does not reflect a new ability to judge between good and evil” (1994, 
134). Briefly, Curley believes that Hobbes either contradicts himself or else he misjudges the 
biblical  narrative.  His opinion that Hobbes’s account  of the Fall  is  bizarre  and perhaps self-
contradictory is shared by many commentators.
I believe that there is some confusion about what Hobbes understands by “knowledge”. 
To me, Hobbes’s position seems quite  clear:  Adam and Eve gained free will  but not God’s 
wisdom44. In fact, Hobbes often tends to differentiate between thought and action in a similar 
fashion. In this case, he writes that: “[when] God saith Hast thou eaten, &c. [it is] as if he should 
say, doest thou that owes me obedience, take upon thee to judge of my commandments?” (Lev.  
xx, 17) Note the distinction that Hobbes makes between “obedience”, which relates to action, 
and “judgement”, which relates to opinion or belief. The same distinction between obedience 
(doing) and opinion (believing) is evident in the following passage on civil law: “Bound, I say, to 
obey it [civil law], but not bound to believe it; for men’s belief and interior cogitations are not 
subject to the commands, but only to the operation of God, ordinary or extraordinary” (Lev. xxvi, 
41, added emphasis). Therefore, the distinction between ‘believing’ and ‘doing’ is a  general 
44 This might be related to Hobbes’s belief that wisdom comes with experience. A man, unlike God, has a limited 
life-span and therefore limited experience and wisdom.
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theme in Hobbes. In a pre-lapsarian state, obedience was inseparable from judgement, which was 
implicitly understood to be God’s judgement, not one’s own. Therefore, in an ideal pre-lapsarian 
state,  through  God’s (intellectual) mediation, ‘what I do’ was the same as ‘who I am’ which, 
through substitution of God’s judgement for one’s own, always resulted in ‘I do the Good’ and ‘I 
am Good’. In contrast, in a fallen post-lapsarian state, by losing the value of obedience, humanity 
has  also  lost  the  benefit  of  God’s  mediation  understood  by  Hobbes  as  God’s  (intellectual) 
knowledge45.
Free Will
The free will that Adam and Eve gain implies two abilities according to Hobbes: first, 
freedom of action is  the right to act against or irrespective of what one believes to be good or 
else what is actually objectively good (as decreed by God). In other words, freedom of action 
allows man to act in a manner that is inconsistent with his beliefs. Second, freedom of thought is 
the ability to challenge God’s understanding, or the right to choose what to believe is good and 
evil   independent  of any questions  of truth (see  Lev.  vi,  49-53).  Put  differently,  freedom of 
thought basically permits man to be objectively wrong. To conclude, in Hobbes’s commentary 
on Genesis 3, the knowledge gained from eating of the tree amounts to the right to an opinion 
that does not necessarily correlate with objective truth and to the right to act contrary to one’s 
belief. For example, think of the ‘knowledge’ of a racist man, or of a climate-change skeptic – 
this is no true knowledge but only opinion. As such, Hobbes writes that “having both eaten [fruit 
from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil], they did indeed take upon them God’s office, 
which is judicature of  good and  evil,  but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them 
aright46” (Lev.  xx, 17).  The key distinction that  Hobbes makes and Curley seems to miss is 
45 As God is omniscient, this knowledge is implicitly perfect, in a way that leave no room for the uncertainty that 
plagues the post-lapsarian state of nature.
46Aright = correctly or properly
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between: ‘God’s office of judicature’, which correlates with free will and implies freedom of 
opinion and freedom of action, and ‘the ability to correctly judge’, which refers to wisdom as the 
ability to recognize what is objectively true as distinct from opinion. The separate question of 
(God’s) wisdom is also discussed at length by Hobbes, mostly through his view on ontology, 
epistemology, and science. 
Obedience
I think that this rather brief and misunderstood account of the Fall is more important to 
Hobbes than it  might seem to be at  first  glance.  Following the logic of the distinctions  that 
Hobbes makes between objective truth and opinion and well as between belief/knowledge and 
action, it seems that the origins of the state of nature are consistent with the account of the Fall. 
To explain, the main problem of the state of nature is uncertainty: not being able to know ‘who 
the other is’ as a result of not being able to know ‘what the other will do’. The ‘unknowability’  
of the other stems more generally from the possibility of discrepancy between belief and action, 
as manifest in the ability of man to disregard natural law (even though its precepts are written in 
his heart by God). In contrast to something like St. Augustine’s reading of Genesis 3, Hobbes 
sees the problem of uncertainty as mostly external to the human individual. For example, unlike 
Augustine’s doctrine of Original Sin, according to which humans are genetically predisposed to 
violate Christian ethics as a consequence of their disobedience, Hobbes focuses on the loss of 
obedience as (externally) compelled by law instead.
Both Hobbes and Augustine think that society is a mix of people who are more or less 
anti-social – a corpus permixtum. However, while Augustine believes that the war of all against 
all resulting from the corpus permixtum is a fact of secular life that must be simply accepted and 
borne with Christian virtue (as well as contained through good governance), Hobbes believes 
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that it is possible to re-gain the benefit of obedience by re-binding individuals in a new political 
covenant. Therefore, in response to the idea of the  corpus permixtum  (understood as a rough 
equivalent of the mix of modest and vainglorious individuals in the state of nature),  Hobbes’s 
political-religious project can be seen as an attempt to homogenize the citizenry – to build a 
corpus homogeneus in the  saeculum  so to speak. This reading is usually the source of some 
commentators’ suspicions that Hobbes, as some sort of atheist, seeks to replace the Christian 
God with the sovereign state. While not entirely false, this entire argument is problematic, most 
likely  because  it  begins  with  an  incorrect  assumption:  universal  psychological  egoism.  As 
already discussed, Hobbes conceived of ‘evil’ as something that is external. I would argue that 
evil is a consequence of the loss of the benefits of obedience.
Based on the Hobbesian narrative, what has man gained from eating of the forbidden fruit 
but the freedom to be wrong and to act unnaturally? Hobbes seems to believe that mankind lost  
something that is much more important then whatever he might have gained. As such, another 
(more Hobbesian) way to understand the consequences of the Fall is to think of man’s loss of all 
the benefits that come with the obedience due to God – the loss of obedience effectively leads to 
the  conditions  that  make  the  state  of  nature  into  a  state  of  war.  However,  it  is  spiritually 
impossible  for  man  to  return  to  a  prelapsarian  state  of  obedience  just  as  it  is  physically 
impossible for him to crawl back into the womb – the damage has been done. However, Hobbes 
seems to believe that pre-lapsarian conditions can be replicated (or imitated) by re-instituting a 
state of obedience. As such, Hobbes’s conception of the civil state, the Leviathan, is in a sense a 
substitute for the prelapsarian state of obedience to God. 
This understanding of the Leviathan in relation to Hobbes’s reading of Genesis 3 frames 
Hobbes’s  insistence  that  the  Leviathan  is  an  artificial  God  (see  Lev.  intro).  Furthermore,  it 
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challenges interpretations of this claims as either heretical or atheistic.   Briefly, Leviathan is 
God-like because it compels obedience to the laws of nature, as God allegedly did in the pre-
lapsarian  state.  Furthermore,  Leviathan  is  man-like  because  the  essential  nature  of  man  is 
contained in the laws of nature that Leviathan makes binding upon all – therefore the ‘shape’ of 
the  state  reflects  that  of  man,  in  the  manner  of  the  cosmic  microcosm-macrocosm 
correspondence theme. In imitation of pre-lapsarian society, civil law takes away that free will, 
which might sound like a good thing but is actually a very bad thing. Free will, re-defined as the 
loss of obedience, puts men in the state of war. Conversely, obedience puts men in a state similar 
to the pre-lapsarian one. In other words, civil law re-establishes the justice that once existed in a 
pre-lapsarian society by restoring a consistency between ‘who I am’, ‘what I do’,  and also ‘what 
is good’ that was lost in the Fall. Once again, as Hobbes puts it, “Civil and natural law are not 
different kinds, but different parts of law” (xxvi, 8).
Knowledge
The distinction between free will (freedom of thought and freedom of action) and God’s 
wisdom problematizes human knowledge: having lost the direct benefit of God’s wisdom, how 
do individuals  distinguish  between true  and false  beliefs?  In  the  absence  of  a  restored  pre-
lapsarian state of obedience, man must deal with the uncertainty born of the fact that he has free 
will but lacks the wisdom necessary to use it well. Therefore, I will briefly consider Hobbes’s 
thoughts on human knowledge.
Hobbes’s understanding of the world can be summed up as follows: everything that exists 
is “matter in motion” 47 (Lev, i, 4); that is to say that objects interact by moving each other along 
set patterns of cause and effect (Lev.  v, 2).  Animal and human reason is part and parcel of the 
reason that governs nature. Therefore, through this participation in reason, humans can access 
47 Physicist James Clerk Maxwell famously said something very similar a couple centuries later.
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some of reality by mapping48 events as chains of causality. Nature works in logical ways and life-
forms themselves are a sort of distinct self-sustained internal motion machines (Lev.  intro, 1). 
However, full understanding of the nature of reality is not accessible to humans. In Hobbes’s 
words, “No discourse whatsoever can end in absolute knowledge of fact past or to come” (Lev.  
vii, 3). Although the capacity to reason gives us some understanding of the world, we must come 
grasp with the unknown in all aspects of life.
According to Hobbes, all knowledge starts with information received and processed by 
the  senses  that  are  proper  to  each  animal  (Lev.  i,  4).  Animal  brains  then  process  sensory 
information  through  subconscious  and conscious  processes  that  manifest  it  as  imagination  - 
mental pictures and thoughts, ranging from simple to highly complex constructs (Lev.  ii, 1-3). 
This information is then stored in memory (which tends to ‘degrade” overtime) (Lev.  vii,  3). 
According to Hobbes, all animals have some ability to reason, that is, to notice patterns and 
identify causal chains within their respective horizons of significance – he sometimes refers to 
this as “prudence”, which is a kind of instinctive wisdom developed with age and experience 
(Lev.  xii,  4).  However,  because  of  their  use of  language and method enhances  their  natural 
reason, human beings engage in complex and abstract thought (xii, 1), especially when driven by 
curiosity and not just necessity (Lev. iii, 5). 
Belief
Briefly,  for an individual,  to  believe something,  understood in opposition to “infallibly 
know[ing]”, is to accept a claim after having verified it “from arguments not taken from the thing 
itself,  or from the principles of natural reason” but from the opinion of another (Lev.  vii,  7). 
Arguments from authority or custom therefore qualify, though I argue that civil law constitutes a 
48 Note that mapped is not the same as understanding, but instead the activity of ‘arranging’ words, which can 
sometimes facilitate understanding (since, as Hobbes believes, man reasons visually).
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special case of knowledge and therefore cannot properly be called belief. On the other hand, to 
know is to accept a claim as a consequence of having verified it infallibly using reason. 
Most beliefs take the form of conjectures about chains of events in the past or the future 
and  therefore  involve  questions  of  possibility  and  probability  (Lev.  xii,  8,  19).  This  echoes 
Hobbes’s understanding of the state of war as similar to something like a weather forecast. It is  
worth noting that, according to Hobbes, the validity of a forecast is independent of the actual 
outcome.  For  instance,  the  occurrence  of  the  improbable  does  not  change  it  status  as 
“improbable”. Therefore, the forecast does not determine what will happen but simply maps out 
what could conceivably happen, based on available data and method. It is crucial not to confuse 
forecasting  with either  determining or planning,  as this  could lead  to  a misunderstanding of 
fortune as predestination, which would (unfairly) suggest that Hobbes subscribes to Laplacean 
style scientific determinism49.
For Hobbes, belief also seems to be a social, relational concept. To explain, whenever an 
individual  decides  to  believe  something,  he enters  into a  relationship  with  the  object  of  his 
inquiry. Because believing is a type of positioning whereby one claim is chosen over others, 
belief seems to be a two-way street: a belief makes implications about the subject as well as the 
object.  First,  belief  reflects  a  subject’s  individuality  –  the  unique  combination  of  abilities, 
education,  interests,  dispositions,  associations  (with groups),  predispositions,  and experiences 
that result in a set of preferences. In other words, although belief is not objective, individuals 
also do not believe at random. 
Second, belief also attempts to describe an object/ the world as distinct from oneself, and 
therefore also ultimately seeks objectivity in an ideal exchange. So when believing something, to 
49 Hobbes somewhat disapproves of common understandings of fortune, which is why he tries to promote a more 
‘scientific’ notion of uncertainty as distribution instead – the latter is at least useful as it allows individuals to engage 
in anticipation and planning.
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what extent are we describing the object of the inquiry and to what extent are we describing 
ourselves? This is a difficult question since it requires that we become self-conscious observers 
and reflect on the way that we reflect. For example, scientific types of inquiry seeks to reduce the 
distance between subject and object, either by making the object more like the subject or by 
making the subject more like the object. Being a realist, Hobbes prefers the latter, which is to say 
that wherever necessity does not impose itself as a physical law, human beings should use their 
limited agency to choose to imitate nature (i.e., be modest rather than vainglorious). 
Science
Before Hobbes, it was not common to think of politics as a science. The main reason for 
this opinion seems to have been the belief that the subject (and object) of politics, man, was 
inherently unpredictable. As a consequence, it was also believed that politics could not produce 
definite  rules  in  the  same way that  a  field  like  physics  can.  Instead,  politics  was  generally 
associated with wisdom and the arts50. Like a great actor, musician, or sculptor, a great politician 
was understood as someone with a good deal of natural intuitive talent whose skills and abilities 
improved with practice. Basically, there was a certain mystique to politics that Hobbes seem to 
try his best to dispel. Where the ancients saw the human person, and by extension the gods, as 
essentially chaotic and unpredictable51, Hobbes saw universal patterns of behaviour as tendencies 
described by the laws of nature. Contrary to a ‘classical’ view, Hobbes believed that politics, like 
physics, was ruled by: on one hand, features of human psychology and anthropology which were 
to be taken as givens and on the other hand by dependable chains of cause and effect.
50 It is useful to remember at this point that Hobbes actually argues that wisdom and science are more similar than 
different and therefore this distinction might not be very meaningful.
51 The more dependent someone is, the more predictable he is. On one hand, the gods, being accountable to no one, 
were terrible; on the other hand, peasants, being dependent on a great many things, were predictable..
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Hobbes  thinks  that  “REASON  […]  is  nothing  but  reckoning  (that  is,  adding  and 
subtracting)” of words (Lev. v, 2). Therefore, in opposition to ‘belief’ taken on the authority of 
another,  science, according to Hobbes, is “the knowledge of consequences, and dependence of 
one  fact  upon another”  or,  more  precisely,  “a knowledge of  all  the consequences  of  names 
appertaining to the subject in hand” (Lev.  v, 17).  The latter  phrasing emphasizes the role of 
language as a filter in science. As per Hobbes’s epistemology, science does not (and cannot) 
describe the world-as-it-is  but instead only the world as perceived by humanity,  through the 
common lens that  is  commonly  called  “objectivity”.  Specifically,  science produces objective 
knowledge because it is based on what is common and universal to all members of the species: 
emotions (as pertaining to similarities in human psychology), sensory data, reason, and language. 
Hobbes problematizes language in the following iteration of his definition : “[science is] when 
the discourse is  put  into  speech,  and begins with the definitions  of  words,  and proceeds by 
connexion of the same into general affirmations, and of these again into syllogisms, the end or 
last sum is called the conclusion, and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional 
knowledge, or knowledge of the consequences of words, which is commonly called science.” 
(Lev. vii, 4) 
This last definition emphasizes the way that even the most objective of scientific findings 
is technically thrice filtered “reality”: once through sense, twice through chains of reasoning, and 
thrice through language-games. In light of this, objectivity seems to actually be a partly ethical 
claim.  To illustrate,  Hobbes makes an interesting  association  between science  and ethics  by 
appealing to the universally shared nature of reason and the senses: “Sometimes a man desires to 
know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof 
one after another, supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what will 
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become of a criminal re-cons what he has seen follow on the like crime before, having this order 
of thoughts: the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows. Which kind of thoughts 
is  called  foresight,  and  prudence,  or  providence,  and  sometimes  wisdom,  thought  such 
conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious52” (Lev.  iii, 
7).
A Priori   Science 
While rather obsolete in contemporary philosophy of science, the distinction between a 
priori  and  a posteriori  sciences is important to Hobbes’s contractarian conception of politics. 
Furthermore,  the distinction seems to mirror  Hobbes’s distinction between  ex-ante  and  post-
factum  analysis. According to  Hobbes, the only true  a priori53 science is mathematics54 (more 
specifically geometry, though his usage of the term seems to incorporate arithmetic and some 
early  forms  of  calculus)  (Lev.  iv,  12).  Because  mathematics  is  independent  from  sensory 
experience,  it  is the only purely abstract science and the only field capable of certainty (i.e., 
perfect knowledge);  as Hobbes puts it,  mathematics (geometry) is “virtually  the only precise 
science55 that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind” (Lev. iv, 12). To illustrate, a 
true  mathematical  statement  is  understood to  have  no mistakes  in  the  operations  so  that  an 
affirmation  like  2+3=5 leaves  no  real  room for  belief,  only  demonstration56.  However,  such 
52 Note that wisdom, which Hobbes typically associates with prudence,  is of a practical and situational nature – 
different from science (!), which is abstract and general. Prudence is a character trait or a virtue of a person. Wisdom 
is the activity of prudence. Similar to the difference between concepts of ‘science’ and (a particular individual) 
‘being scientifically minded.’
53 (Lat. “before”), A priori science uses deductive reasoning to reach conclusions starting from axioms and known 
general rules.
54 In his usage of terms, Hobbes seems to actually regard mathematics as separate from other types of science. 
Science depends on the shared human features of senses, reason, and language, and mathematics technically doesn’t 
depend on the senses (only insofar as it is practiced by human beings). However, mathematics counts as an example 
of something that is known together, which is how Hobbes seems to justify the practical as well as moral importance 
he accords to science.
55 Variant from the Latin.
56 Hobbes was writing around the time that Newton and Leibniz were inventing calculus and before statistics 
solidified as a field – any modern mathematics involving infinity would be a significant challenge to some of 
Hobbes’s ideas. The mathematical concept of infinity gave Hobbes a lot of trouble, as seen in several mathematical 
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certainty is intangible because mathematics is concerned with numbers, which have no material 
existence apart from the things they count. Wittgenstein and Poincaré have famously argued that 
these  kinds  of  mathematical  proofs  (whether  they  use  numbers  or  words)  are  in  a  sense 
tautological  reasoning.  For  example,  2+3=5,  which  can  be  rewritten  as  5=5,  does  not  say 
anything new about the world from a ‘god’s eye’ point of view. However, for more intellectually 
limited human creatures investigating the world, the real utility of a priori science seems to be in 
its application in a posteriori science methodologies. 
Briefly,  in  a  posteriori  science,  equivalence  tautology  is  useful  in  modelling  and 
formulating  hypotheses  to  isolate  and investigate  unknowns in  the  objective  world  of  sense 
experience.  Like solving for x in an arithmetic equation, a hypothesis tries to express what is 
unknown in terms of what is known. For instance, while 5=5 does not add anything new about 
the  world in  itself,   2+x=5 explains  x (namely  that  x=3).  In  other  words,  hypotheses  allow 
individuals to engage in modelling and to make testable informed guesses about causal patterns. 
Note the echoes of the Hobbesian notion of “anticipation” as applies to objective knowledge 
instead of social interactions. 
The idea (of the possibility of) a priori science shapes Hobbes’s idea of politics because 
the combinatorial potential of this kind of bounded reasoning allows the possibility of creating a 
self-consistent  ontological  bubble within nature;  this  is how I propose that  Hobbes thinks of 
politics:  as  a  subset  of  nature.  As Charles  Taylor  (2016) consistently  points  out,  despite  its 
limitations,  this  kind  of  tautological combinatorial  ‘knowledge’  allows  a  kind  of  bounded 
creativity much like a bin full of LEGO bricks – the bricks can be combined in infinitely many 
ways and can be used to model anything so long as none of the parts (bricks) are transformed or 
papers he attempted to write (he is not generally considered to be a good mathematician – I propose that one of the 
reasons for this is that he tries to make his mathematics consistent with his philosophy instad of the other way 
around).
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destroyed. There is some creative potential in a priori politics, as seen in the construction of the 
social contract. However, it is important to keep in mind that nothing in this new ontological 
bubble contradicts any natural laws, which hold true by necessity.  Therefore, man’s political 
power to construct society is more a case of rearranging matter that is pre-existent in imitation of 
nature.
Generally, how do we decide whether we know something objectively or merely believe 
it?  As  previously  seen,  the  law  of  nature  implies  two  major  categories  of  psychological 
similarities between men: rational and emotional (“passions”). Since all humans participate in 
logic equally by nature, logic being part of the law of nature, the best way of determining what is 
not individual opinion but a more general truth is to see what tends to be ‘known in common’, 
Hobbes’s understanding of objectivity is surprisingly democratic:  ultimately,  the criterion for 
objectivity  is  a  combination  of  consensus  and  dialectics.  For  example,  Hobbes  writes  that 
“whosoever persuadeth by reasoning from principles written maketh him to whom he speaketh 
judge, both of the meaning of those principles, and also of the force of his inferences upon them” 
[…] And generally, in all cases of the world, he that pretendeth any proof maketh judge of his 
proof  him  to  whom  he  addresseth  his  speech.”  (Lev.  xlii,  32)  Therefore,  a  community’s 
consensus is the community’s criteria of truth and objectivity. 
As  previously  mentioned,  there  is  a  similarity  of  passions  between  all  men  but  not 
between the particular objects of said passions (Lev.  intro, 3). Interestingly, Hobbes basically 
(re)defines  “conscience”  to  denote  ‘knowledge  that  is  shared’,  which  refers  to  Hobbesian 
standards for objective truth57: “When two or more men know of one and the same fact, they are 
said to be CONSCIOUS of it one to another, which is as much as to know together.” (vii, 4). 
Furthermore, in the same passage, Hobbes claims that it is evil “for any man to speak against this 
57 He bases this on the etymology of the word, from the Latin con- (together) and -scire (to know).
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conscience,” thereby merging (collective-based) objectivity and morality; this echoes Hobbes’s 
insistence that while in the state of nature the law of nature cannot be called “moral” or “just”, 
there is an inherent “rightness” to it that partially rests upon its universality which in turn relates 
to God’s self-revelation through Adam’s creation in the  imago Dei  and through Christ.  This 
rhetorical move is effective but somewhat dubious as Hobbes conveniently blurs the distinction 
between his ‘objective/scientific’ re-definition of conscience and qualities of the common usage 
definition which conscience make moral and legal implications.
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Chapter 6: Limits of Knowledge 
Once the things that are known are accounted for, the things are not known are perhaps 
even more important according to a Hobbesian epistemology. To explain,  at the extremes of 
uncertainty, Hobbesian epistemology is often apophatic, which is to say that knowledge that is 
absent can be more significant that knowledge that is present. For instance, think of how the 
modest individuals’ lack of knowledge about their interlocutor determines their demeanor and 
even  personality,  thus  leading  to  a  state  of  war;  despite  the  various  similarities  that  allow 
individuals  knowledge  of  others  (through  analogy  with  oneself),  it  is  that  one  fundamental 
uncertainty – the absence of knowledge about whether or not one’s interlocutor is modest of 
vainglorious – that is the determining factor which makes the state a nature a state of war. 
According to Hobbes, some things that are unknown are potentially  knowable,  whether 
completely or partially,  but other are fundamentally  unintelligible. Having lost the benefit  of 
God’s insight (through the loss of obedience after the Fall), as a consequence of their embodied 
creaturely nature, humans and animals perceive the world only through sense experience, which 
is like looking through a glass darkly58. This in an important insight as it suggests that even the 
most  objective  of  scientific  knowledge  is  only  an  interpretation  of  material  reality59,  which 
emphasizes the fact the humans only access some parts of all that exists. For instance, God’s true 
nature  is  fundamentally  mysterious,  beyond what  God chooses  to  reveal  through nature and 
revelation (though Hobbes disputes the pertinence of the latter) (xii, 25; xxxii, 3). To illustrate, 
Hobbes writes on the implausibility of the beatific vision: “there is no such thing as perpetual 
58 See 1 Cor. 13 – I would actually make an argument that Hobbes’s apophatic approach is consistent with several 
aspects of Pauline philosophy.
59 ex. See vii, 3: “No man can know by discourse that this or that is, has been, or will be, which is to know 
absolutely, but only that if this be, that is, if this bad been, that has been, if this shall be, that shall be, which is to 
know conditionally and that not that consequence of one thing to another, but of one name of a thing to another 
name of the same thing.” (vii, 3). 
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tranquility of mind because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without 
fear, no more than without sense. What kind of felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly 
honour  Him,  a  man  shall  no  sooner  know  than  enjoy,  being  joys  that  now  are  as 
incomprehensible as the word of school-men beatifical vision is unintelligible” (Lev. vi, 58). This 
passage indicates a firm rejection of the possibility of ever fully knowing God.
Finally,  sensory  perception  is  also  prone  to  ‘technical’  errors  (as  distinct  from 
epistemological  limits)  and  therefore  is  not  always  reliable;  for  example,  think  of  optical 
illusions – this is something that Hobbes spent a lot of time thinking about. In the end, as Hobbes 
puts it, “And thought at some certain distance the real and very object seem invested with the 
fancy it begets in us, yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another” (Lev. i, 4). 
Therefore, at best, even when objectively true human understanding of the word is possible in 
theory, it is limited in practice by (the imperfection of) creaturely senses. In the end, some parts 
of reality  remain essentially  mysterious,  because all  objective  knowledge remains  essentially 
human knowledge, as distinct from the divine knowledge whose benefit was lost after the Fall. 
Mystery
Briefly, based on my study of Hobbes, I propose that he makes a distinction between two 
main types of mystery– the unknown and the unknowable. The unknown is essentially accessible 
–but potentially knowable; it can be problematized, estimated, and even found out. An example 
is the aforementioned idea of sympathetic wisdom according to which one can understand an 
interlocutor  through analogy with oneself.  In contrast,  Hobbes believes  that  some things  are 
fundamentally inaccessible to God’s creatures. The unknowable denotes that which is completely 
beyond  the  potential  horizon  of  scientific  knowledge  in  general.  The  unknowable  is  a  hard 
epistemological limit for Hobbes – it not only marks the limits of scientific knowledge but also 
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maintains the absolute distinction between God and his creatures and further emphasizes the 
political need for God (which is partly addressed by the Leviathan as a stand-in for the divine 
omnipotence and omniscience). To sum up, on one hand, the accessible unknown is forever at 
the edges of human expanding horizons of knowledge and therefore, with the help of scientific 
inquiry, potentially knowable in the future; on the other hand, the (inaccessible) unknowable is 
on another plane entirely and therefore beyond understanding. I will argue that the unknowable 
transcends  science  (or  politics)  as  Hobbes  conceives  it  and  can  only  be  addressed  by  a 
theological vocabulary. 
Science, despite being pretty good at engaging with the accessible unknown, lacks the 
tools  to  engage  with  the  unknowable.  Hobbes’s  work,  specifically  his  thoughts  on  the 
fundamentally unknowable/mysterious, suggests the possibility of an apophatic epistemology60. 
The human endeavour to systematically engage the unknowable, the seeds of which are notably 
present in Plato and Philo, finds its culmination in apophatic theology. According to Vladimir 
Lossky, apophatic  theology,  or “the negative way of the knowledge of God is  an ascendant 
undertaking  of  the  mind  that  progressively  eliminates  all  positive  attributes  of  the  object  it 
wishes to attain, in order to culminate finally in a kind of apprehension by supreme ignorance of 
hum who cannot be an object of knowledge” (1985, 13). In this sense, apophatic theology is a 
negative science;  where science seeks the intellectual  experience of understanding, apophatic 
theology seeks the “intellectual experience of the mind’s failure” to understand (Lossky 1985, 
13). I think that apophatic theology should be applied to interpret Hobbes because it engages 
directly the ontological space where Hobbes seems to think the religious experience takes place – 
at  the  hard  epistemological  limits;  Lossky  describes  the  exact  same  space  as  the  locus  of 
60 I should note that while I am focusing on Christian traditions, all major religions have some form of apophatic 
theology.
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apophatic theology: a space of consciousness of “the radical lack of correspondence between our 
mind and the reality it wishes to attain” (1985, 13). Apophatic theology is equipped for analysis 
of the paradox that often perplexes many of Hobbes’s more scientifically-bent commentators.
To  explain,  because  the  limits  of  epistemology  are  in  a  sense  synonymous  with  the 
distinction between man and God, I believe that the problem of excess meaning can only be fully 
engaged in this theological dimension that problematizes extreme uncertainty (unknowability) by 
“expressing above all the deficiency of language and the failure of the mind before the mystery 
of the personal God who reveals himself as transcending every relation with the created” (Lossky 
1985,  16).  Phrased  differently,  theology  is  the  only  system  that  can  engage  with  the  hard 
epistemological limit that is the fundamentally unknowable by problematizing it as the nature of 
God,  whom Clement  of  Alexandria  described as  “the  abyss  of  the Father”;  and Gregory of 
Nazianzus rephrased as “the ocean of undefined and undetermined essence” (in Lossky, 1985, 
21). Therefore, theology is the principal locus of both what Taylor calls excess meaning and 
what I referred to as the unknowable. 
Metaphor
I  believe  that  it  is  possible  that  Taylor’s  (2016)  critique  of  Hobbes’s  of  theory  of 
language mischaracterises it as overly literal is that Taylor does not account for the importance 
of  uncertainty  in  Hobbes’s thought.  For  example,  Taylor  argues  that  Hobbes disapproves  of 
“excess meaning” which culminates in metaphorical language. One reason why I believe that 
Taylor’s  characterization  of  Hobbesian  language  as  averse  to  the  kind  of  “excess  meaning” 
found in metaphorical expression is wrong is:  if language could be strictly literal,  individuals 
could  not  engage  with  the  uncertainty  at  the  limits  of  epistemology;  then  people  could  not 
expand their  horizons to learn,  grow, and change. Hobbes does not hold with these notions. 
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Furthermore, strictly literal interpretations would deny the ontological principle of continuous 
motion/change, and, finally, would deny the concept of poiesis that is so important to Hobbes’s 
concept of community (see Khan 2014). Like everything else that exists, language also must be 
in  a  constant  state  of  change.  Also,  more  importantly,  Hobbes  cannot  be  so  set  against 
metaphorical  language  because  he  makes  ample  use  of  it  himself.  Instead,  I  would  qualify 
Taylor’s  critique  as  follows:  Hobbes  disapproves  of  metaphorical  language  when  used  in 
inappropriate contexts, such as science. After all, no one expects to encounter flowery language 
in a scientific report.
More specifically, the body metaphor is a locus of meeting between all of Hobbes’s key 
axioms, definitions, and beliefs. Hobbes describes the state both as a monstrous human body and 
as a giant mechanism. Charles Taylor argues that “contract theories of political societies” are 
alternatives to ideal of microcosm-macrocosm correspondence where political order reflects a 
divine cosmic order” in which “the [cosmic] order is demystified”  (2016, 110). However, this 
does not seem to apply to Hobbes. Hobbes’s use of the body metaphor to describe the civil state 
confirms that the commonwealth and its civil law is not made in opposition of nature but in 
imitation  of  it  and  as  such  stands  firmly  within  the  macrocosm-microcosm correspondence 
model. In fact, the purpose of science is ultimately control the environment through imitation of 
divine creation: “because when we see how anything comes about, upon what causes, and by 
what manner, when the like causes come into our power, we see how to make it produce the like 
effects” (v, 17). If this passage makes science seem to instrumental and therefore not sufficiently 
spiritual, consider Hobbes’s understanding of nature: “Nature (the art whereby God hath made 
and governs the world) is by the art of man […] imitated, that it can make an artificial animal” 
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(Lev. i, 1).  Therefore, man’s creation of the state can be seen as the prime example of imitatio  
Dei. 
The Mechanical Man
Hobbes  had  an  interesting  insight  about  disciplinary  boundaries  that  is  hinted  at 
throughout his work – mechanics, physics, biology, politics, economics are not so different. I 
think that Hobbes’s mechanistic tropes are often misunderstood to be in opposition to nature and 
biological organisms. However, I would argue that the truth is precisely the opposite. Briefly, 
mechanistic is misunderstood to mean inert, but, in fact, Hobbes’s use of the term suggests a 
definition closer to an orderly system of self-sustained motion. Nature is always the supreme 
model of perfection for Hobbes, both because, as embodied creatures, humans are inevitably and 
irrevocably part and subject to it, and also because of nature’s resilience and efficiency. In other 
words,  Hobbes  doesn’t  seem to  conceive  of  an aspect  of  human culture  as  outside  or even 
against nature, but instead as a part of nature, modelled on nature.
Throughout his  corpus,  Hobbes uses mechanistic analogies just like organic ones – to 
emphasize the unifying causal relationality that brings individuals together into a whole that is 
mysteriously greater than the sum of its parts. This is quite a common idea, not unlike Foucault’s 
later conception of power as the thing that puts everything in relation to everything else. Another 
common variant of this idea is enshrined is one of Barry Commoner’s four rules of ecology: 
“you can never just do one thing” a.k.a. everything is connected to everything else.
Generally, I find that Hobbes uses mechanistic imagery to emphasize the possibility of 
human agency within nature by proposing that a machine (which humans build) is like a living 
body (which God “builds”)  in all  the ways that  matter.  Hobbes’s use of the body metaphor 
illustrates that Hobbes uses mechanistic and organic imagery so as to argues for an equivalence 
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between  the  two. Briefly,  much  like  Baruch  Spinoza  in  The  Theologico-Political  Treatise,  
Hobbes  argues  in  Leviathan  that  all  ways  of  knowing  are  ultimately  pathways  to  better 
understanding  of  God;  furthermore,  understanding  always  increases  in  engagement  with  the 
uncertainty that lies at the limits of human horizons of knowledge.
62
Conclusion
In  this  thesis,  I  have  argued  that  ‘uncertainty’  is  an  axiomatic  concept  in  Hobbes’s 
Leviathan.  Human behaviour and interaction is centered around two fundamental concepts: the 
laws of nature and ‘uncertainty’; in other words, the dynamic between what is fundamentally 
known and what is fundamentally not known. In a way, ‘uncertainty’ can be conceived of as a 
gap or an absence of knowledge or control, while the laws of nature signify a solid presence of  
knowledge and being. However, uncertainty can also be thought of as possibility and opportunity 
for creation and engagement, which casts the laws of nature in a constrictive and deterministic 
light.  If  this  dynamic  between  the  laws  of  nature  and  uncertainty  sounds  like  Augustinian 
theodicy,  that  is  because the two discussions are actually  very similar,  both leading back to 
questions about evil, goodness, and free will. 
To end by returning to the questions of knowledge and religion of the preceding chapter – 
as  previously  argued,  Hobbes  believes  that,  in  the  absence  of  understanding,  fortune  can 
effectively cause religion when it is mistaken for either the particular  agent or the process that 
causes the observed effect (see Lev. xii, 6). Therefore, according to Hobbes, fortune is in a sense 
the reification (and sometimes deification) of man’s ignorance of causes. To illustrate, he writes 
that: 
men “invoked […] their own wit, by the name of Muses; their own ignorance, 
by the name of Fortune; their own lust, by the name of Cupid; their own rage, by the 
name Furies […] insomuch as there was nothing which a poet could introduce as a 
person in his poem, which they did not make either a god or a devil” (Lev. xii, 16).
Interestingly, as seen in the passage above, Hobbes recognizes an internal dimension of 
uncertainty within the human subject, as opposed to the uncertainty that I have discussed so far 
which mainly pertained to ‘who the other is’ and therefore can be labeled as external. However, 
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this passage makes it clear that the unknown is both without (asking ‘who is the other?’) and, in 
a  sense,  within  (asking ‘who am I?’)  Therefore,  in  their  lack  of  understanding of  causality, 
people do not only reify external events but also their own agency and power thereby, ironically, 
mistaking  themselves  for  gods  in  their  ignorance.  In  other  words,  when  individuals  do  not 
understand themselves they can come to fear their own potential.  This is an example of how 
uncertainty  can  also  apply  to  processes  that  are  technically  within  the  grasp  of  human 
understanding and therefore potentially  within our power to control.  In the end,  the internal 
unknown can be formulated as a problem of identity and self-knowledge. Like everything else in 
nature,  man also is constantly being made, destroyed, and re-made in various ways. In other 
words,  as  Hobbes  would  put  it,  as  a  particular  kind  of  matter  in  motion,  humans  are  also 
constantly changing physically, intellectually, and emotionally. In a moment of insight, Hobbes 
calls these continuous changes in man “mutations” (Lev.  vi, 6). Therefore, Hobbes recognizes 
that identity is not static –  virtues, skills, and behaviours change over time depending on one’s 
lived experience.  For example, as per Hobbes’s ontology and epistemologies, interactions with 
objects necessarily cause change (movement) in the subject. Therefore, to be able to engage with 
their  world,  humans  must  adjust  to  limits  and changes  in  their  environments  as  well  as  in 
themselves. For Hobbes, citizenship is an example of such a “mutation,” as man becomes quite 
significantly transformed through participation in political society (as opposed to a hypothetical 
state of nature). 
As such, the emergence of civil law creates a pocket of human ‘in-between space’ that 
allows for reciprocity to dominate social relations. This space essentially mediates between the 
various tensions that exist in state of nature, restricting the passions that lead to war so as to 
permit the fulfillment of the desire for peace. This space also negotiates between the known and 
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the unknown, or between predestination and agency. Hobbes describes this constructed human 
space in the following way which (in)famously puts a social contract at the heart of it: 
“For the laws of nature […] (in sum) doing to others as we would be done to  
[…] of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, 
are  contrary  to  [some of]  our  natural  passions,  that  cause  us  to  partiality,  pride, 
revenge, and the like. And covenants without the sword are but words, and of no 
strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the laws of nature (which 
every one hath then kept, when he has the will  to keep them, when he can do it 
safely), if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man 
will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other 
men” (Lev. xvii, 2).
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